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ON TIME, (IN)EQUALITY, AND DEATH 
Fred O. Smith, Jr.* 
In recent years, American institutions have inadvertently encountered the 
bodies of former slaves with increasing frequency. Pledges of respect are com-
mon features of these discoveries, accompanied by cultural debates about what 
“respect” means. Often embedded in these debates is an intuition that there is 
something special about respecting the dead bodies, burial sites, and images of 
victims of mass, systemic horrors. This Article employs legal doctrine, philosoph-
ical insights, and American history to both interrogate and anchor this intuition. 
Law can inform these debates because we regularly turn to legal settings to 
resolve disputes about the dead. Yet the passage of time, systemic dehumani-
zation, and changing egalitarian norms all complicate efforts to apply tradi-
tional legal considerations to disputes about victims of subordination. While, 
for example, courts usually consult decedents’ expressed intentions to resolve 
disputes, how do we divine the wishes of people who died centuries ago, under 
a legal system designed to negate and dishonor their intentions? How do we 
honor relationships like kinship for people who were routinely and forcibly sep-
arated from their kin? And how do we assess the motives or culpability of in-
stitutions that, in prior generations, were complicit in profound horrors, but 
now pledge honor and respect? 
This Article offers a theory of time and equality to help guide cultural and legal 
debates about the treatment of dead victims of mass horror. On this account, 
we can become complicit in past, systemic subordination by dishonoring the 
memories of victims. Systemic neglect and exploitation of a group’s bodies and 
images can diminish the role of that group in shaping our national memory. 
And if it is wrong to deny a person the ability to leave a legacy on account of 
race under contemporary egalitarian norms, then we ought not engage in post-
humous acts against the enslaved and other systemically debased persons that 
perpetually rob them of such a legacy. 
 
 * Associate Professor, Emory University School of Law. Thanks are due to participants 
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ton, Mary Dudziak, Don Herzog, Timothy Holbrook, Daniel LaChance, Mai-Linh Hong, Lee 
Kovarsky, Genevieve Lakier, Matthew Lawrence, Everett Long, Jonathan Masur, Richard McAd-
ams, Melissa Murray, Martha Nussbaum, Mary Ellen O’Connell, Mar Kidvai Padilla, Charlie 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is no place you or I can go, to think about or not think about, to summon the 
presences of, or recollect the absences of slaves . . . . There is no suitable memorial or 
plaque or wreath or wall or park or skyscraper lobby. There’s no 300-foot tower. 
There’s no small bench by the road. 
Toni Morrison 1 
They were mistreated as slaves, and now they are mistreated in death. 
Fred O. Smith, Sr. 2 
For the survivor who chooses to testify, it is clear: his duty is to bear witness for the 
dead and for the living. He has no right to deprive future generations of a past that 
belongs to our collective memory. To forget would be not only dangerous but offen-
sive; to forget the dead would be akin to killing them a second time. 
Elie Wiesel 3 
Physical manifestations of horrors perpetrated long ago stalk the present. 4 
During the Trump Administration, fierce debates raged in Arizona and Texas 
 
 1. Toni Morrison, A Bench by the Road, WORLD, Jan./Feb. 1989, at 4, 4 [perma.cc/EKP5-
U8DS]. 
 2. Sophia Choi, Pipe Found Near Possible Slave Remains at UGA, WSB-TV (Mar. 28, 
2017, 7:25 PM), https://www.wsbtv.com/news/local/pipe-found-near-possible-slave-remains-
at-uga/506876978 [perma.cc/D4TN-AMFD]. 
 3. ELIE WIESEL, NIGHT, at xv (Marion Wiesel trans., Hill & Wang 2006) (1958). 
 4. Cf. Letter from James Madison to Gilbert du Motier, marquis de Lafayette (Nov. 25, 
1820), in 2 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, RETIREMENT SERIES: 1 FEBRUARY 1820–26 
FEBRUARY 1823, at 158, 159 (David B. Mattern, J.C.A. Stagg, Mary Parke Johnson & Anne Man-
deville Colony eds., 2013) (referring to slavery as America’s “original sin”); Maggie Blackhawk, 
Federal Indian Law as Paradigm Within Public Law, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1800 (2019) 
(“[L]ike America’s other original sin, traces of America’s history with colonialism are woven in 
like threads to the fabric of the document.”). 
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about the federal government’s plans to destroy burial sites of Native Ameri-
cans and enslaved persons. 5 Moreover, enslaved persons’ bodies have fre-
quently been encountered across the United States in recent decades. 6 These 
bodies sometimes hide in plain sight, as with the skulls of Cuban slaves that 
were on display at the University of Pennsylvania until 2020. 7 More often, 
they are disturbed inadvertently. 8 Pledges of respect are common features of 
 
 5. See, e.g., Laurel Morales, Border Wall Would Cut Across Land Sacred to Native Tribe, 
NPR (Feb. 23, 2017, 4:35 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/02/23/516477313/border-wall-would-
cut-across-land-sacred-to-native-tribe [perma.cc/Z47F-ZGRX]; Melissa del Bosque, Trump’s 
Border Wall Would Destroy Historic Gravesites in South Texas, INTERCEPT (Jan. 21, 2019, 9:00 AM), 
https://theintercept.com/2019/01/21/border-wall-gravesites-cemetery-texas [perma.cc/5NKF-
D9SY]; Native Burial Sites Blown Up for US Border Wall, BBC (Feb. 10, 2020), https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-51449739 [perma.cc/5WSW-8KB6]. The events prompted 
multiple lawsuits. E.g., La Posta Band of Diegueño Mission Indians v. Trump, No. 20-cv-01552, 
2020 WL 7398763, at *1–2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2020); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Trump, 453 
F. Supp. 3d 11, 28 (D.D.C. 2020). Another recent lawsuit alleges that the executive order creating 
the border wall violates the Equal Protection Clause. Plaintiffs’ First Amended Original Com-
plaint at 57–59, Zapata Cnty. v. Trump, No. 20-cv-106 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 2020). 
 6. See, e.g., David W. Dunlap, Dig Unearths Early Black Burial Ground, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 
1991), https://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/09/nyregion/dig-unearths-early-black-burial-ground.html 
[perma.cc/MCD5-425D]; Amy Quinton, Black Burial Site Paved Over in Portsmouth, N.H., NPR 
(Feb. 22, 2006, 11:17 AM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5228067 
[perma.cc/8DTN-P4QL]; Mai-Linh K. Hong, “Get Your Asphalt Off My Ancestors!”: Reclaiming 
Richmond’s African Burial Ground, 13 LAW CULTURE & HUMANS. 81, 83 (2017); Robert Hull, 
University Cemetery Survey Yields More Grave Shafts; Commemoration Panel Formed, UVA 
TODAY (Dec. 3, 2012), https://news.virginia.edu/content/university-cemetery-survey-yields-more-
grave-shafts-commemoration-panel-formed [perma.cc/KF7R-9EJA]; Kevin McGill, As Shell Pre-
serves Louisiana Slave Burial Ground, Question Persists: Where Are the Rest?, ADVOCATE (June 
14, 2018, 9:01 AM), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/article_5a1ab0fa-6fdb-
11e8-b6d6-932aad7138e2.html [perma.cc/QCF6-5VUX]; Megan Mittelhammer, Everything 
You Need to Know About the Baldwin Hall Controversy, RED & BLACK (May 4, 2021), 
https://www.redandblack.com/news/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-baldwin-hall-
controversy/article_fff28aa0-bf0a-11e9-9256-4f177f5f318c.html [perma.cc/GQ87-M6VY]; Al-
ice Goulding, U. Will Enlist Expert to Investigate African American Burial Ground Found Under 
Penn Property, DAILY PENNSYLVANIAN (Apr. 18, 2018, 10:32 PM), https://www.thedp.com/arti-
cle/2018/04/african-american-burial-ground-west-philadelphia-upenn-penn-expert-university-phil-
adelphia [perma.cc/4WYZ-HNV2]; Michaela Winberg, Philly’s Black Burial Grounds and the 
Battle for Preservation, BILLY PENN (Mar. 24, 2019, 9:15 AM), https://billypenn.com/2019/03/24
/phillys-black-burial-grounds-and-the-battle-for-preservation [perma.cc/QD4H-QAE6]; Emma 
Claybrook, Burial Ground for Dozens of Slaves Discovered at AR Church, PHILA. TRIB. (Nov. 18, 
2019), https://www.phillytrib.com/news/across_america/burial-ground-for-dozens-of-slaves-discov-
ered-at-ar-church/article_b774f27e-7082-55e0-8adc-3d873c611dd8.html [perma.cc/JG86-JGQF]; 
Melissa Lemieux, Florida Country Club Discovered 40 Slave Graves Buried Under Its Property, So 
What Happens Now?, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 26, 2019, 10:44 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/flor-
ida-country-club-discovered-40-slave-graves-buried-under-its-property-so-what-happens-now-
1479305 [perma.cc/W7XY-46DB]; Possible Slave Cemetery Found on Georgia College Campus, 
AL.COM (May 13, 2019, 11:55 AM), https://www.al.com/news/2019/05/possible-slave-ceme-
tery-found-on-georgia-college-campus.html [perma.cc/3AQ6-YJCG]. 
 7. Nora McGreevy, The Penn Museum Moves Collection of Enslaved People’s Skulls into Stor-
age, SMITHSONIAN (Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/after-outcry-
penn-museum-removes-skulls-enslaved-people-public-view-180975466 [perma.cc/RU5A-73E9]. 
 8. See, e.g., Dunlap, supra note 6. 
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these discoveries, accompanied by cultural debates about what respect 
means. 9 When a slave cemetery was discovered at the University of Georgia, 
a prominent Georgia political leader reminded the public: “They were owned 
in life, but UGA doesn’t own them in death.” 10 
The topic of posthumous interests is not new. Indeed, it has long pervaded 
legal doctrine. Over a century ago, Justice Joseph Lumpkin III of the Georgia 
Supreme Court observed that “the law—that rule of action which touches all 
human things—must touch also this thing of death.” 11 And while the jurist 
offered that observation in an opinion about whether a railroad company’s 
negligence caused the disfigurement of a corpse, 12 the statement is no less apt 
with respect to death’s less corporeal, more metaphysical dimensions. Even 
after life’s final hour, important legal questions about human dignity, crea-
tions, reputation, will, and equality abound. 13 Law confronts these questions 
by means of torts, 14 contracts, 15 trusts and estates, 16 intellectual property, 17 
 
 9. When the University of Virginia discovered remains of slaves, it committed to “assure 
respect for the remains of those buried,” and “to memorialize these graves in as respectful man-
ner as possible.” Hull, supra note 6. This was also the approach when, in 1991, a slave burial site 
was discovered during the construction of a courthouse in New York City. A government official 
pledged that it was “absolutely essential that the remains that were found on the site be treated 
with the utmost respect and dignity.” Dunlap, supra note 6. 
 10. Blake Aued, Black Leaders Criticize UGA over Slave Graves at Baldwin Hall, FLAGPOLE 
(Mar. 4, 2017), https://flagpole.com/news/in-the-loop/2017/03/04/black-leaders-criticize-uga-
over-slave-graves-at-baldwin-hall [perma.cc/X29N-R3PD]. The author of the statement was Mi-
chael Thurmond, Georgia’s former labor commissioner and the current chief executive of the 
state’s fourth most populous county. Mark Niesse, Mike Thurmond Wins DeKalb County CEO 
Race, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.ajc.com/news/local-govt--politics/mike-
thurmond-wins-dekalb-county-ceo-race/IothDnqv1IfymWkHXgR3uO [perma.cc/XP65-S33H]. 
 11. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Wilson, 51 S.E. 24, 25 (Ga. 1905). 
 12. Id. at 24. 
 13. See DANIEL SPERLING, POSTHUMOUS INTERESTS: LEGAL AND ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 
(2008); Fred O. Smith, Jr., The Constitution After Death, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1471 (2020) (dis-
cussing ways that law protects and undermines dignity, reputational interests, creations, will, 
equality, and spirituality after death); DON HERZOG, DEFAMING THE DEAD (2017) (assessing 
ways that American law inadequately protects reputational interests after death); RAY D. MADOFF, 
IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING POWER OF THE AMERICAN DEAD (2010) (describing 
the legal interests of the dead and contending that these legal protections have unduly accreted 
over time). 
 14. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1979). 
 15. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 711.002(g) (West 2017). 
 16. See, e.g., Wright v. Zeigler, 1 Ga. 324, 346 (1846); Burton v. Yeldell, 30 S.C. Eq. (9 Rich. 
Eq.) 9, 15 (Ct. App. 1856); see also Knost v. Knost, 129 S.W. 665, 666 (Mo. 1910) (identifying a 
“right to testamentary disposition”). 
 17. See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY & ROGER E. SCHECHTER, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND 
PRIVACY § 1:3, at 4–5 (2021 ed. 2021); 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (permitting the copyrighting of works 
created before 1978 for up to ninety-five years after the death of an author). 
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criminal law, 18 freedom of information, 19 civil procedure, 20 evidentiary 
rules, 21 constitutional law, 22 and even antidiscrimination law. 23 Law, there-
fore, regularly depends on an accounting of posthumous interests. 24 Some-
times, courts are asked to decide whether an alleged offense against a deceased 
person was “outrageous,” 25 “[un]reasonable,” 26 or “reckless.” 27 Other times, 
courts must balance interests of the living against the dignitary, reputational, 
or privacy interests of the dead. In these cases, courts ask whether the reason 
for a disturbance of the decedent’s interests are “adequa[te]” or “compel-
ling.” 28 In other instances, it is policymakers who explicitly or implicitly en-
gage in this type of balancing. Policymakers determine which lawsuits survive 
the death of a party, for example. 29 And more broadly, they create statutory 
and regulatory mandates that govern the treatment of cemeteries, human re-
mains, images, estates, reputations, and personal information. 30 
Despite the important legal contexts in which these assessments take 
place, there is limited legal commentary about how to weigh posthumous legal 
interests as a class. 31 Those who have written about posthumous legal interests 
 
 18. See IDAHO CODE § 18-4801 (2016); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6103 (Supp. 2019); LA. 
STAT. ANN. § 14:47 (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.510 (2019); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-15-01 
(2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 771 (2020); see also 4 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL 
LAW § 524, at 182–83 (15th ed. 1996). 
 19. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 168–69 (2004). 
 20. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 588–90 (1978). 
 21. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998). 
 22. Smith, supra note 13. 
 23. Mark E. Wojcik, Discrimination After Death, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 389, 390 (2000); Long 
v. Mountain View Cemetery Ass’n, 278 P.2d 945, 946 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955); People ex rel. 
Gaskill v. Forest Home Cemetery Co., 101 N.E. 219, 220–21 (Ill. 1913); Rice v. Sioux City Mem’l 
Park Cemetery, 60 N.W.2d 110, 115–16 (Iowa 1953). 
 24. Throughout this Article, the term “law” is deployed in three ways: law as mandate, 
law as mirror, and law as method. What does extant law require with respect to our memory and 
will when we die? What values are reflected in those legal assessments? And how can we better 
apply those reflected principles both in law and life? 
 25. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.10 cmt. 2 (AM. L. INST. 1962). 
 26. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.01(B) (LexisNexis 2019). 
 27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1979). 
 28. See, for example, GA. CODE ANN. § 36-72-8 (2019), which instructs decisionmakers to 
consider, when receiving an application to disinter human remains, “[t]he adequacy of the ap-
plicant’s plans for disinterment and proper disposition of any human remains or burial objects” 
and “[a]ny other compelling factors which the governing authority deems relevant.” The statute 
also requires “[t]he balancing of the applicant’s interest in disinterment with the public’s and 
any descendant’s interest in the value of the undisturbed cultural and natural environment.” Id. 
 29. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 588–90 (1978). 
 30. See, e.g., Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–
3013. See generally Smith, supra note 13 (identifying long-standing legal protections for the dead). 
 31. Most writing in this area focuses on specific subsets of posthumous interests (i.e., rep-
utation, property, or body). Don Herzog, for example, has written about the reputational inter-
ests of the dead, especially in the immediate aftermath of their death. His key examples include 
someone lying about someone at a funeral and someone placing false, stigmatizing information 
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have tended to narrow their inquiries to the “ ‘newly-dead’ as opposed to the 
‘long-dead.’ ” 32 And even less still has been written about the ways that treat-
ment of the dead interacts with identity-based subordination. 33 This Article 
fills those gaps. Are there common principles, patterns, or trends to help us 
decide what’s “outrageous” and what’s “reasonable” treatment of the dead? 
How does one determine which kinds of treatment deserve approbation or 
opprobrium? And how should factors like time, historic subordination, and 
changing egalitarian values inform the answers to these questions? 
As an illustration of the complexity of these kinds of questions, one might 
reflect on the disparate ways that American culture and law treat the publica-
tion of gruesome photographs of dead bodies. The proverbial court of history 
celebrates the moment in which Emmett Till’s mother allowed Jet magazine 
to publish a photograph of Till’s horridly maimed corpse during the civil 
rights era. 34 The graphic photo powerfully revealed the depraved, murderous, 
and unimaginably brutish nature of apartheid in the United States. Moreover, 
with some unease, the United States legally permits people to post photo-
graphs of their deceased close friends and family on social media. 35 On the 
 
in an obituary. HERZOG, supra note 13 (arguing for a broader set of laws banning the defamation 
of the dead). Moreover, authors have written thoughtfully about the law of trusts and estates—
an area that by its nature focuses on the interests and will of dead persons. See, e.g., LAWRENCE 
M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS, TRUSTS, AND INHERITANCE LAW 
(2009) (examining the history of the law of posthumous property transfer and exploring what 
that history teaches about the changing nature of human relationships); David Horton, Inde-
scendibility, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 543, 577 (2014); Tanya K. Hernández, The Property of Death, 60 
U. PITT. L. REV. 971, 972 (1999) (concluding two decades ago that “the legal system ha[d] not 
adequately addressed the need for decedent autonomy in confronting death and defining fam-
ily”). Further, a few authors have written about questions related to interment and burial. TANYA 
MARSH, THE LAW OF HUMAN REMAINS (2016); NORMAN L. CANTOR, AFTER WE DIE: THE LIFE 
AND TIMES OF THE HUMAN CADAVER (2010); CHRISTINE QUIGLEY, THE CORPSE: A HISTORY 
(1996); PERCIVAL E. JACKSON, THE LAW OF CADAVERS AND OF BURIAL AND BURIAL PLACES (2d 
ed. 1950). Andrew Gilden has written more broadly about legal models of “legacy stewardship” 
and applied lessons from those models to the context of deceased persons’ digital media ac-
counts. The Social Afterlife, 33 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 329, 332–33 (2020). 
 32. SPERLING, supra note 13, at 1 (“[This] book is mainly concerned with the ‘newly dead’ 
as opposed to the ‘long-dead.’ ”). An exception is Ray Madoff, who argues that the dead control 
the living for longer periods of time in growing and concerning ways. See MADOFF, supra note 13. 
 33. Wojcik, supra note 23, at 400; Smith, supra note 13, at 1518. 
 34. ELLIOTT J. GORN, LET THE PEOPLE SEE: THE STORY OF EMMETT TILL (2018); Bracey 
Harris, Emmett Till Photo Incensed and Inspired a Generation, CLARION LEDGER (Aug. 30, 2018, 
6:00 AM), https://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/2018/08/30/emmett-till-photo-incensed-
and-inspired-generation/1018644002 [perma.cc/9R5C-BRZ8]; When One Mother Defied Amer-
ica: The Photo That Changed the Civil Rights Movement, TIME (July 10, 2016, 12:46 PM), 
https://time.com/4399793/emmett-till-civil-rights-photography [perma.cc/E2VW-8MD6]. 
 35. Penelope Green, The iPhone at the Deathbed, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/02/18/style/iphone-death-portraits.html [perma.cc/HU9X-7GZJ]. 
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other hand, legal mandates often prevent journalists and others from access-
ing and publishing gruesome photographs of the dead. 36 Indeed, courts have 
criminally indicted individuals for “abuse of corpse” when soldiers and others 
have taken or published photographs of the dead. 37 What accounts for the 
varied cultural and legal treatment of acts that seem so similar? Part I of this 
Article shows how American law engages in culturally contingent assessments 
when balancing posthumous legal interests. These questions only become 
more complex when applied to victims of past mass horrors. 
We need frameworks for addressing these complex questions. And be-
cause law has dealt with posthumous legal interests for centuries (at least), 
legal analysis can play a critical role in constructing these frameworks. Part II 
of this Article demonstrates how law traditionally values the decedent’s will, 
relationships, motives, and culpability. Generally, three principles are of par-
ticular salience in assessing posthumous interests. The first is the consent and 
will of the deceased person. That is, the deceased person’s consent plays a par-
amount role in determining the legally permissible disposition of matters rea-
sonably within her control. Second, American legal norms take seriously the 
nature of the living person’s relationship with the dead person by virtue of 
factors like kinship, contract, control, and community. Third, the law takes 
seriously the intentions and motives of the living person who is acting toward 
(or against) the dead. Remuneration, deception, and harmful intentions are 
all treated suspiciously when regulating the treatment of dead persons. Part 
III applies these traditional principles to debates about how to treat violently 
subordinated mass victims’ dead bodies, burial sites, and images. 
In Part IV, this Article focuses attention on the role of time and equality 
in posthumous legal assessments, demonstrating the law’s veneration of our 
preserved collective memory and its embrace of egalitarian norms in the twen-
tieth century. With regard to time, this Article argues that in American law, 
any specific individual’s memory and dignitary interests tend to diminish over 
time. By contrast, the law tends to concern itself with the preservation of col-
lective memory and dignity long after death. This is illustrated by laws gov-
erning historical preservation, which give more protection to cemeteries and 
structures over time rather than less. 
This Article also shows that egalitarianism and related norms of antisub-
ordination also came to shape the law of the dead in underappreciated ways 
over the course of the twentieth century. By fostering stigma, fueling terror, 
 
 36. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 160, 166–69 (2004); Megan 
Bittakis, Tragic Representations: The Curious Contradiction Between Cases Seeking Access to Au-
topsy and Death Scene Photographs and Cases Regarding the Consequences of Such Photographs 
Being Published, 40 N. KY. L. REV. 161 (2013); Clay Calvert, The Privacy of Death: An Emergent 
Jurisprudence and Legal Rebuke to Media Exploitation and a Voyeuristic Culture, 26 LOY. L.A. 
ENT. L. REV. 133 (2006). 
 37. See Bill Chappell, Navy SEAL Demoted for Taking Photo with Corpse of ISIS Fighter, 
NPR (July 3, 2019, 4:13 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/03/738463353/jury-reduces-navy-
seals-rank-for-taking-photo-with-corpse-of-isis-fighter [perma.cc/7M68-PXGB]; see also State 
v. Condon, 789 N.E.2d 696, 699 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003). 
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and legally estranging individuals from the government, unequal and brutal 
treatment of the dead can serve as an important site of subordination.38 
Taken together, these descriptive observations have normative signifi-
cance. If collective memory is valuable across generations, and if abusing the 
memory of the dead can serve to perpetuate subordination, then we must be 
careful about how we remember and treat the abused and the debased dead. 
One generation’s treatment of the dead can unwittingly advance a previous 
generation’s subordination. On this theory, when a group is subordinated 
through acts of mass horror, later generations can become complicit in that 
horror by exploiting and dishonoring the subjugated peoples’ memory. In 
building this theory, this Article relies on arguments advanced by George 
Pitcher, Joel Feinberg, Martha Nussbaum, and Don Herzog. On this account, 
an individual can experience posthumous harm when someone alters the 
shape of the decedent’s unique life. In this Article, I invite readers to consider 
the special implications this theory has when members of a targeted group’s 
memories are subordinated in a systemic and sustained way. 
Part IV also outlines a theory of how generations can become complicit 
in previous generations’ horrors and how this complicity is compounded by 
corrupted collective memory and lineal alienation. The risk of intergenera-
tional complicity is particularly high in the United States in light of two as-
pects of this nation’s history. First, powerful actors in previous generations 
intentionally disrupted America’s collective memory about this nation’s mass 
human rights abuses. 39 Monuments honoring colonizers and Confederates 
outnumber memorials to the colonized, the captured, and the controlled by 
orders of magnitude. Past subordination shapes our present memory. Second, 
America has a significant history of what I will call “lineal alienation.” By lineal 
alienation, I mean ways that violent, identity-based subordination has dis-
rupted some individuals’ relationships with their descendants. 40 Because of 
 
 38. Smith, supra note 13, at 1518–19. 
 39. See CHARLES REAGAN WILSON, BAPTIZED IN BLOOD: THE RELIGION OF THE LOST 
CAUSE, 1865–1920 (1980); GAINES M. FOSTER, GHOSTS OF THE CONFEDERACY: DEFEAT, THE 
LOST CAUSE, AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW SOUTH, 1865 TO 1913, at 4 (1987). 
 40. This concept is deeply related to, and distinct from, Orlando Patterson’s profoundly 
influential conception of “natal alienation.” ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH 
5 (1982). Natal alienation has been defined as “the deprivation of rights or claims of birth, of 
claims on and obligations to parents, and of connection to living blood relations, ancestors, or 
descendants.” Peggy Cooper Davis, Contested Images of Family Values: The Role of the State, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 1348, 1362 (1994). Building on Patterson’s work, some scholars have also persua-
sively argued that natal alienation describes America’s treatment of indigenous persons as well. 
See James P. Sterba, Understanding Evil: American Slavery, the Holocaust, and the Conquest of 
the American Indians, 106 ETHICS 424, 437–38 (1996) (reviewing LAURENCE MORDEKHAI 
THOMAS, VESSELS OF EVIL: AMERICAN SLAVERY AND THE HOLOCAUST (1993)); Rebecca Tsosie, 
Sacred Obligations: Intercultural Justice and the Discourse of Treaty Rights, 47 UCLA L. REV. 
1615, 1662 (2000). By invoking the concept of lineal alienation, I wish to bring attention to the 
multidirectional effects that accompany the uprooting of persons from their ancestral origins. 
The ancestor loses access to descendants who can care for her memory, dignity, and legacy. 
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lineal alienation, slaves have fewer living trustees to care for their memories 
and legacies. 
After outlining these descriptive and theoretical claims about time and 
equality, layered with American history, this Article turns to a related ques-
tion. To the extent that this theory of time and equality reflects worthy aspi-
rational norms, are there ways that the law can be oriented to better reflect 
those norms? Part V offers four prescriptions for how legal doctrine and pol-
icy can better avoid this kind of intergenerational complicity. First, America’s 
history of lineal alienation has implications for who should be considered a 
legally cognizable trustee of the interests of the exploited, subjugated dead. 
When slave cemeteries are discovered, for example, placing exclusive weight 
on biological kinship when determining whether someone has a legal claim is 
troubling, even cruel, in a country that forcedly and routinely separated slaves 
from their kin. The second reform concerns protection for abandoned ceme-
teries. I argue that when such cemeteries are disturbed inadvertently, they 
should not be further disturbed without procedural and substantive protec-
tions akin to those that known abandoned cemeteries receive. Third, if courts 
and lawmakers take the proffered relationship between time, equality, and 
death seriously, this has implications for what type of conduct is deemed “un-
reasonable,” “offensive,” and “outrageous,” all of which are important legal 
terms in the law governing dead bodies and images. Any equitable accounting 
of these kinds of contextually inflected terms must acknowledge America’s 
history of violent subordination, legal erasure, and lineal alienation. Fourth, I 
argue for significant governmental investment in monuments, museums, arts, 
and other resources designed to counter false, corrupted memories about 
America’s past. 
I. THE CULTURAL CONTINGENCY OF POSTHUMOUS INTERESTS 
[C]ourts will not close their eyes to the customs and necessities of civilization in deal-
ing with the dead and those sentiments connected with decently disposing of the re-
mains of the departed which furnish one ground of difference between men and brutes. 
Justice Joseph Lumpkin III 41 
“Respectful.” “Offensive.” “Ethical.” “Outrageous.” Dueling words like 
these serve as lodestars and admonitions when the bodies and images of vic-
tims of past horrors are unearthed and exposed. When, for example, research 
revealed that fifty-three skulls on display at a museum at the University of 
Pennsylvania were those of former slaves from Cuba, the university stated that 
it was “committed to working through this important process with heritage 
community stakeholders in an ethical and respectful manner.” 42 And when 
 
 41. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Wilson, 51 S.E. 24, 25 (Ga. 1905). 
 42. Johnny Diaz, Penn Museum to Relocate Skull Collection of Enslaved People, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/27/us/Penn-museum-slavery-skulls-
Morton-cranial.html [perma.cc/R8AH-AQRY]. See generally ANN FABIAN, THE SKULL 
COLLECTORS: RACE, SCIENCE, AND AMERICA’S UNBURIED DEAD (2010) (profiling nineteenth-
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the University of Georgia (UGA) discovered a badly neglected slave cemetery 
on its campus, it promised that its treatment of the bodies would be “respect-
ful” and “dignified.” 43 
Those institutions and others, however, have faced vocal concerns and 
vehement criticism. Activists at Penn asked the university to repair the dam-
age done by the “unethical acquisition” and exploitation of the crania and, 
more broadly, called on the university to “remove all images from the Mu-
seum’s digital footprint that represent the deceased without consent.” 44 At 
UGA, a faculty committee concluded that it was factually “not possible” to 
accept the university’s official narrative that the remains were treated in an 
“exemplary and respectful way.” 45 The report cited, among others, my own 
father, a Georgia native and a key critic of UGA’s disinterment of the human 
remains. In a manner that moved me as a descendant of former slaves, a son, 
and a scholar, he implored the local community at a public forum: “If you 
can’t get outraged about someone destroying your great-grandparents’ graves, 
what can you get outraged about?” 46 
Law has a potentially important role in contextualizing and informing 
these recurring cultural disputes, because law has long been a mode through 
which Americans have confronted questions about the proper treatment of the 
dead. For example, there are at least four long-standing “rights” after death in 
America’s legal tradition: bodily integrity (protection against mutilation and 
other bodily violations), dignified interment, protection against undignified 
disturbance once interred, and control over the disposition of one’s property. 47 
This Part outlines how courts and policymakers are necessarily called on 
to assign weight to these posthumous legal interests. That is, they assess which 
factors add gravity to the decedents’ interests, and which factors diminish 
 
century researcher Samuel George Morton, whose extensive collection of human skulls contrib-
uted to the pseudoscience of racial superiority); Lisa A. Giunta, Note, The Dead on Display: A 
Call for the International Regulation of Plastination Exhibits, 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 164 
(2010) (criticizing recent museum exhibits for “putting the bodies of the deceased on display for 
profit” without sufficient consent or respect). 
 43. UNIV. OF GA., REPORT FROM THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON BALDWIN HALL TO THE 
FRANKLIN COLLEGE FACULTY SENATE 37 (2019), https://www.franklin.uga.edu/sites/de-
fault/files/Faculty%20Senate%20ad%20hoc%20committee%20report%204-17-19.pdf 
[perma.cc/B523-6H4W] [hereinafter UGA BALDWIN HALL REPORT]. 
 44. #PoliceFreePenn: An Abolitionist Assembly (@policefreepenn), Repatriation & Rep-
arations NOW! Restating What We Mean by Abolish the Morton Collection., MEDIUM (Apr. 14, 
2021), https://medium.com/@policefreepenn/repatriation-reparations-now-restating-what-
we-mean-by-abolish-the-morton-collection-9a67f9206279 [perma.cc/AL7H-KKVS] [hereinaf-
ter Abolish the Morton Collection]. 
 45. UGA BALDWIN HALL REPORT, supra note 43. 
 46. Rebecca McCarthy, Panel Wrestles With UGA’s Legacy of Slavery, FLAGPOLE (Mar. 
27, 2017), https://flagpole.com/news/city-dope/2017/03/27/panel-wrestles-with-ugas-legacy-
of-slavery [perma.cc/L3UE-ZAKH]. 
 47. Smith, supra note 13, at 1475. Law also protects posthumous interests in privacy and 
equality. See Weaver v. Myers, 229 So. 3d 1118 (Fla. 2017); 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2020) (defining 
“protected health information” to include identifiable health information regarding patients 
who have been deceased for fewer than fifty years); see also Smith, supra note 13, at 1518–27. 
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those interests. This is true in two ways. First, legal mandates in this area often 
rely on elements that are culturally contingent or dependent on community 
sensibilities. These include terms like “outrageous,” “offensive,” “reasonable,” 
“and “respect.” Second, even when legislatures issue more precise legal rules 
that protect interests after death, these decisionmakers must choose which as-
pects of humanity to honor after death, how to honor them, and how to bal-
ance those interests against the needs and desires of the living.48 
A. Culturally Contingent Terms 
In his book The Work of the Dead: A Cultural History of Mortal Remains, 
cultural historian Thomas Laqueur writes, “[T]he dead have two lives: one in 
nature, the other in culture.” 49 Laqueur’s work canvasses the many ways that 
humans have shown reverence to human bodies across time and place. 50 
Among the norms that vary are the suitability of certain sites of burial, the 
acceptability of cremation, and the relative importance of individually marked 
tombstones. He observes, to be sure, that cultures appear to have universal 
respect for human remains. 51 But what constitutes respectful conduct is far 
from fixed. Consistent with these observations, to the extent that legal man-
dates concerning the dead turns on what “outrages” or “offends,” these man-
dates are imbued with cultural values and norms. Because terms like this 
pervade the law of the dead, this body of law offers a rich site of study. 
Included in this discussion are torts and crimes that focus on familial out-
rage or distress. One might question whether those elements belong in a dis-
cussion about posthumous legal interests. To the extent that a law turns on 
the distress of living family members, how could such a law furnish a mean-
ingful example of a court weighing interests after death? I include claims based 
on familial outrage and anguish for two reasons. First, the history of familial 
claims such as “abuse of corpse” are historically bound up in the idea that 
families are surviving trustees for the interests of the dead. In the 1820 English 
case Gilbert v. Buzzard, Lord Stowell (Sir William Scott) noted the long-stand-
ing right of the dead “to be returned to [their] parent earth for dissolution[] 
 
 48. As a doctrinal matter, extracting these principles can help bring clarity to the law and 
offer administrable standards for courts to apply. As a cultural matter, by appreciating what law 
has tended to deem “reasonable” or “outrageous” with respect to deceased persons, there may 
be lessons about the dimensions of our shared humanity that are valued after death. In turn, 
those lessons can help institutions and individuals answer hard cultural questions when the law 
seems insufficient or uncertain. 
 49. THOMAS W. LAQUEUR, THE WORK OF THE DEAD: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF MORTAL 
REMAINS 10 (2015); see also Mary L. Dudziak, Death and the War Power, 30 YALE J.L. & 
HUMANS. 25, 38 (2018). 
 50. LAQUEUR, supra note 49; see also CANTOR, supra note 31; QUIGLEY, supra note 31. 
 51. See LAQUEUR, supra note 49, at 40; see also Smith, supra note 13, at 1507 (“Because 
cultures almost universally assign human meaning to the dead and adopt conventions to protect 
the dead, violations of these conventions dishonor that meaning. And violating that meaning is 
thereby a form of dishonoring shared human dignity.” (footnote omitted)). 
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and to be carried there for that purpose in a decent and inoffensive manner.” 52 
Relying on that right, American courts recognized a living person’s “quasi 
property” interest in the dead bodies of family members to facilitate this right 
of burial. 53 This “quasi property” interest in the body arises from “duties to 
perform towards it arising out of our common humanity,” as a leading nine-
teenth-century case put it. 54 Second, and perhaps more importantly, legal pro-
tection of a surviving family from outrage, anguish, and offense is itself a 
useful site of study. These protections invite reflection on the cultural norms 
that shape who (including which family members) can serve as trustees for 
dead persons, whose outrage is legally cognizable, and what mental anguish is 
deemed foreseeable or compensable. 
1. “Outrage” 
“Outrage” is often an element of criminal and civil claims against those 
who commit abuses against the dead. Laws that prohibit the abuse of corpses 
and desecration of grave sites tend to focus on conduct that would likely out-
rage the community or family. Tennessee courts, for example, have held that 
“[t]he gravamen of the offense” of indecently disposing of a dead body “is that 
the facts supporting the crime be such that ‘the feelings and natural sentiments 
of the public would be outraged.’ ” 55 A Tennessee statute similarly defines des-
ecration of a burial site as “defacing, damaging, polluting or otherwise physi-
cally mistreating in a way that the person knows or should know will outrage 
the sensibilities of an ordinary individual likely to observe or discover the per-
son’s action.” 56 
This reliance on outrage is neither new nor unique. In the 1939 case State 
v. Bradbury, Maine’s high court upheld the conviction of a man for indecently 
burning his sister’s dead body “in such a manner that, when the facts should 
in the natural course of events become known, the feelings and natural senti-
ments of the public would be outraged.” 57 Similarly, Ohio law bans abuses of 
dead bodies that reasonably outrage families or community sensibilities. 58 
Laws in Colorado, Delaware, Hawaiʻi, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia also 
ban conduct against dead persons or burial sites that outrage “community 
 
 52. (1820) 161 Eng. Rep. 1342, 1348; 3 Phill. Ecc. 333, 352–53. 
 53. Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 238–39 (1872). 
 54. Id. at 242–43. 
 55. Wilks v. State, No. E2002-00846-CCA-R3-PC, 2002 WL 31780720, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. 
App. Dec. 13, 2002) (quoting John S. Herbrand, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Appli-
cation of Statutes Making It a Criminal Offense to Mistreat or Wrongfully Dispose of Dead Body, 
81 A.L.R.3D 1071, 1073 (1977)). 
 56. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-301 (Supp. 2020); see also id. § 39-17-311(a)(1) (2018). 
 57. 9 A.2d 657, 659 (Me. 1939). This language was later codified. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 17–A, § 507 (2006). 
 58. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.01(B) (LexisNexis 2019). 
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sensibilities.” 59 Moreover, the Model Penal Code recommends that states 
criminalize actions that “treat[] a corpse in a way that he knows would outrage 
ordinary family sensibilities.” 60 
In the civil context, treatment of the dead often intersects with the tort of 
“intentional infliction of emotional distress”—a claim that also requires “out-
rage.” For plaintiffs to prove “intentional infliction of emotional distress, or 
outrageous conduct,” there are three key elements: “(1) the conduct complained 
of must be intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct must be so outrageous that 
it is not tolerated by civilized society; and (3) the conduct complained of must 
result in serious mental injury.” 61 “Generally, the case is one in which the rec-
itation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his 
resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous.’ ” 62 
Facts that have sustained this type of tort action include a case where a 
person disinterred a body, doused the body with “caustic chemical,” and then 
left parts of the body in the forest. 63 Likewise, trespassing onto a cemetery and 
damaging a tombstone has sustained an outrage claim. 64 A court has also sus-
tained an outrage claim where an undertaker refused to return to a widow her 
deceased husband’s body in order to coax her into buying a more expensive 
casket. 65 And more recently, a federal court sustained an outrage claim in a 
high-profile case involving Natalee Holloway, an eighteen-year old Alabama 
resident who disappeared while vacationing in Aruba. A media outlet alleg-
edly misled Holloway’s mother about whether bones and other biological ma-
terial were her daughter’s, knowing the bones likely belonged to an animal. 
“Such conduct is plausibly extreme and outrageous and so severe that no rea-
sonable person could be expected to endure it under Alabama law.”66 
The concept of outrage has also been invoked in equitable cases concern-
ing whether to disinter bodies. One notable example is Judge Benjamin 
Cardozo’s 1926 opinion in Yome v. Gorman. 67 In that case, a widow requested 
that the owners of a religious cemetery disinter her deceased husband so that 
she could bury him in a plot next to one she had purchased for her own burial. 
 
 59. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-113 (2020); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 711-1107 to -1108 
(LexisNexis 2016 & Supp. 2020); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5509 (West 2015); W. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8-14 (LexisNexis 2020). Delaware law bans desecration of “object[s] of ven-
eration,” DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 1331 (2021), which has been used to support prosecutions for the 
desecration of grave sites. See State v. Melvin, No. C.R. 1507023761, 2016 WL 616979, at *1 (Del. 
Ct. Com. Pl. Feb. 5, 2016). 
 60. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.10 (AM. L. INST. 1962). 
 61. Akers v. Prime Succession of Tenn., Inc., No. E2009-02203-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 
4908396, at *21 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2011) (quoting Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 
(Tenn. 1997)), aff’d, 387 S.W.3d 495 (Tenn. 2012). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Gray Brown-Serv. Mortuary, Inc. v. Lloyd, 729 So. 2d 280, 285–86 (Ala. 1999). 
 64. Whitt v. Hulsey, 519 So. 2d 901, 903–06 (Ala. 1987). 
 65. Levite Undertakers Co. v. Griggs, 495 So. 2d 63, 64 (Ala. 1986). 
 66. Holloway v. Oxygen Media, LLC, 361 F. Supp. 3d 1213, 1225 (N.D. Ala. 2019). 
 67. 152 N.E. 126, 127 (N.Y. 1926). 
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Other close kin supported her request. But, writing for the New York Court 
of Appeals, Judge Cardozo explained that only in some “rare emergency” 
would it be acceptable for a court “to take a body from its grave in consecrated 
ground and put it in ground unhallowed if there was good reason to suppose 
that the conscience of the deceased, were he alive, would be outraged by the 
change.” 68 The opinion instructed the trial court to privilege evidence of the 
decedent’s wishes on remand. For decades thereafter, Judge Cardozo’s opin-
ion served as “the leading case on this subject”; relying on Yome, other courts 
sought to avoid moves that would “outrage” decedents if they were alive. 69 
2. “Offensive” 
When laws regulate dead bodies and matters of interment, another ele-
ment or term is “offensiveness.” The term is much less common than “out-
rage” but is nonetheless a long-standing feature of this body of law. An early 
invocation of this element can be found in the 1912 case Seaton v. Common-
wealth. 70 In that case, an impoverished father buried his prematurely born son 
in a self-created wooden coffin in his backyard rather than a cemetery. 71 While 
he was convicted for indecently burying his son, the Court of Appeals of Ken-
tucky (then Kentucky’s highest court) reversed, finding that the interment was 
not sufficiently offensive as a matter of custom. It reasoned, 
The custom of the country imposed upon [the] appellant only the duty of de-
cently burying his child; that is, it must be properly clothed when being taken 
to the place of burial, and then placed in the ground or tomb, so that it will 
not become offensive or injurious to the lives of others. He may not cast it 
into the street, or into a running stream, or into a hole in the ground, or make 
any disposition of it that might be regarded as creating a nuisance, be offen-
sive to the sense of decency, or be injurious to the health of the community. 72 
The defendant’s actions comported with this duty even if, the court gratui-
tously added, he was “a man utterly lacking in parental instincts.” 73 
Today, some statutes formally incorporate offensiveness as an element of 
crimes concerning the abuse of dead bodies. In Arkansas, for example, it is 
illegal to “[p]hysically mistreat[] or conceal[] a corpse in a manner offensive 
to a person of reasonable sensibilities.” 74 The phrase “in a manner offensive to 
 
 68. Yome, 152 N.E. at 128. 
 69. Goldman v. Mollen, 191 S.E. 627, 633 (Va. 1937); Friedman v. Gomel Chesed Hebrew 
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 72. Id. at 873. 
 73. Id. 
 74. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-60-101(a)(2) (2016). 
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a person of reasonable sensibilities” means, among other things, “in a manner 
that is outside the normal practices of handling or disposing of a corpse.”75 Like-
wise, in Tennessee, it is a felony to “[p]hysically mistreat[] a corpse in a man-
ner offensive to the sensibilities of an ordinary person.” 76 In Texas, it is a crime 
if one “disinters, disturbs, damages, dissects, in whole or in part, carries away, 
or treats in an offensive manner a human corpse.” 77 Moreover, it is a crime in 
Texas to vandalize, damage, or treat “in an offensive manner the space in which 
a human corpse has been interred or otherwise permanently laid to rest.” 78 
3. Reasonableness 
For over a century, the tort of negligence has been invoked when persons 
or institutions unreasonably mutilate a dead body or otherwise interfere with 
a burial. One leading case on the subject is Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. 
v. Wilson. 79 In 1903, a woman bought a train ticket to transport her husband’s 
body from Atlanta to a small town in eastern Georgia, where he was to be 
buried. When the train carrying the body reached a junction point, the rail-
road company placed the body on an open platform, where it lay in the rain 
unprotected for several hours. The body became “soaked and otherwise mu-
tilated.” 80 Georgia courts found that this conduct was grossly negligent and 
allowed the widow to sue for damage to the $75 coffin and shroud, as well as 
humiliation and mental anguish. 81 
Wilson represents a broader class of cases against those who negligently 
perform their duty to care for dead bodies or otherwise negligently interfere 
with interment. And while the plaintiff in Wilson alleged “gross negligence,” 
some jurisdictions have allowed recovery for ordinary negligence in this con-
text. 82 Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, “One who intentionally, reck-
lessly or negligently removes, withholds, mutilates or operates upon the body 
of a dead person or prevents its proper interment or cremation is subject to 
liability to a member of the family of the deceased who is entitled to the dis-
position of the body.” 83 
Culturally contingent assessments about how the dead are to be treated 
inflect our understanding of the gravity of the plaintiff’s loss, overriding the 
physical-injury requirement for negligence claims. In most negligence cases, 
it is highly unusual to allow recovery for mental anguish caused by ordinary 
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 76. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39–17–312 (2018). 
 77. 12 TEX. JUR. 3D CEMETERIES § 61, at 68–69 (2019). 
 78. Id. 
 79. 51 S.E. 24, 25 (Ga. 1905). 
 80. Wilson, 51 S.E. at 24. 
 81. Id. at 24–25. 
 82. See, e.g., Del Core v. Mohican Historic Hous. Assocs., 837 A.2d 902, 905 (Conn. App. Ct. 
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negligence absent a showing of physical injury. As explained in the 1984 edi-
tion of Prosser and Keeton’s treatise, “Where the defendant’s negligence 
causes only mental disturbance, without accompanying physical injury, illness 
or other physical consequences, and in the absence of some other independent 
basis for tort liability, the great majority of courts still hold that in the ordinary 
case there can be no recovery.” 84 Yet treatment of dead bodies represents an 
exception to that general rule. Courts often allow recovery “for negligent em-
balming, negligent shipment, running over the body, and the like, without 
such circumstances of aggravation.” 85 As one federal court recently put it, 
[A]lthough courts have traditionally been reluctant to allow negligence ac-
tions where only emotional damages are claimed, the more modern view 
supports the position taken by plaintiff in the instant case and recognizes an 
ordinary negligence cause of action arising out of the next of kin’s right to 
possession of a decedent’s remains. 86 
4. Respect 
The degree of legal protection that cemeteries receive sometimes depends 
expressly on the public’s recognition and respect. This legal standard is most 
evident in cases involving disinterment or destruction of gravesites. That is, 
among the many ways that a cemetery can lose legal protection is that mem-
bers of the public no longer treat it as a cemetery. In the early 1920s, for ex-
ample, in South Carolina, a plaintiff sued developers that disturbed a site 
containing his family’s human bodies. The developers alleged that the ceme-
tery had been abandoned and therefore merited significantly less legal protec-
tion than an active cemetery. When the issue reached the South Carolina 
Supreme Court, that tribunal articulated its goal of approximating public sen-
timent on this delicate subject. It explained that 
laws do, or should, set forth the sentiment of the people who are subject to 
them. This is particularly true under a government like ours. From the time 
of Abraham, the places where the dead were buried have been considered 
sacred and inviolate. All nations respect the graves of the dead. 87 
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994 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011); Vasquez v. State, 206 P.3d 753, 765 n.10 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008); Black-
well v. Dykes Funeral Homes, Inc., 771 N.E.2d 692, 697 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); Guth v. Freeland, 
28 P.3d 982, 988 (Haw. 2001); Kelly v. Brigham & Women’s Hosp., 745 N.E.2d 969, 978 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 2001); Contreraz v. Michelotti–Sawyers, 896 P.2d 1118, 1120–21 (Mont. 1995); Brown 
v. Matthews Mortuary, Inc., 801 P.2d 37, 44 (Idaho 1990); Moresi v. Dep’t of Wildlife & Fisher-
ies, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1095–96 (La. 1990). 
 86. Cochran v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, 59 N.E.3d 234, 246–49 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). 
 87. Frost v. Columbia Clay Co., 124 S.E. 767, 768 (S.C. 1924). 
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In determining whether the defendants had illegally disturbed graves, the 
court accordingly cited a legal treatise for the proposition that “where a cem-
etery has been so neglected as entirely to lose its identity as such, and is no 
longer known, recognized, and respected by the public as a cemetery, it may 
be said to be abandoned.” 88 This standard for abandonment has been cited in 
number of states across the country, including Alabama, Kansas, New York, 
and Pennsylvania. 89 
B. Culturally Contingent Balancing 
Some legal regulations expressly call on decisionmakers or judges to bal-
ance the need for respectful treatment of the dead against other important 
public interests. This kind of balancing is particularly pronounced in cases in-
volving disinterment. Under a Georgia statute, for example, when an entity 
applies for a permit to disturb an abandoned cemetery, local authorities are to 
balance “the applicant’s interest in disinterment with the public’s and any de-
scendant’s interest in the value of the undisturbed cultural and natural envi-
ronment.” 90 Among other factors, local authorities are also required to 
consider “[t]he adequacy of the applicant’s plans for disinterment and proper 
disposition of any human remains or burial objects” as well as “[a]ny other 
compelling factors which the governing authority deems relevant.” 91 And un-
til recently, Iowa law required that upon determining whether to permit dis-
interment, “[d]ue consideration . . . shall be given to the public health, the 
dead, and the feelings of relatives.” 92 
More frequently, these kinds of balancing standards have been incorpo-
rated by way of the common law. These balancing tests reflect cultural choices 
about how to honor and prioritize competing desires and needs. Under Illi-
nois law, for example, 
 
 88. Id. at 770 (citations omitted). 
 89. Boyd v. Brabham, 414 So. 2d 931, 935 (Ala. 1982); State ex rel. Stephan v. Lane, 614 
P.2d 987, 997–98 (Kan. 1980); Ferncliff Cemetery Ass’n v. Town of Greenburgh, 124 N.Y.S.3d 
61, 67 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020); In re First Evangelical Lutheran Church, 13 Pa. D. & C.2d 93, 99 
(Ct. Quarter Sess. Westmoreland Cnty. 1957). 
 90. GA. CODE ANN. § 36-72-8 (2019). 
 91. Id. 
 92. IOWA CODE § 144.34 (2020) (amended 2020). The revised statute de-emphasizes the 
will of the decedent. See IOWA CODE § 144.34 (2021) (“Due consideration . . . shall be given to 
the public health, the preferences of a person authorized to control final disposition of a dece-
dent’s remains . . . , and any court order.”); cf. Gilden, supra note 31 (encouraging decentering 
the decedent when stewarding a person’s legacy after death and instead focusing more on the 
decedent’s social context). 
November 2021] On Time, (In)equality, and Death 213 
[i]t is the policy of the law, except in cases of necessity or for laudable pur-
poses, that the sanctity of the grave should be maintained, and that a body 
once suitably buried should remain undisturbed, and a court will not ordi-
narily order or permit a body to be disinterred unless there is a strong show-
ing that it is necessary and that the interests of justice require. 93 
Over the past century, various balancing tests for proper disinterment have been 
adopted in California, 94 Colorado, 95 Minnesota, 96 Mississippi, 97 New Mexico, 98 
and Pennsylvania. 99 Among the most common factors in these tests include the 
wishes of the decedent and the relationship between the decedent and the per-
son seeking to disinter the body. Also common are appeals to the public in-
terest: California law instructs courts to consider “the interests of the public”; 100 
in Colorado, the “[i]mpact of disinterments on others”; 101 and in New Mexico, 
the “public interest.” 102 In Minnesota, courts are asked to weigh “[t]he strength 
of the reasons offered both in favor of and in opposition to reinterment.” 103 
II. TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLES OF POSTHUMOUS INTERESTS 
Our legal system allows the dead to control the living, at least up to a point. 
Lawrence Friedman 104 
There are common principles that structure how courts weigh and en-
force posthumous legal interests. First, the clear, good-faith wishes of the de-
cedent are generally honored when practicable. Second, the law takes seriously 
the relationship between the decedent and the living person or institution at-
tempting to act toward, or on behalf of, the dead. Law confers agency and ob-
ligations based on conceptions of kinship, contract, control, and community. 
Third, motive and fault are important. American law encourages suspicion 
when a living person is profiting off a dead person without consent; acts with 
deception; is knowingly, recklessly, or unreasonably causing harm; or killed 
the decedent. 
 
 93. Fischer’s Est. v. Fischer, 117 N.E.2d 855, 857 (Ill. App. Ct. 1954). 
 94. Maffei v. Woodlawn Mem’l Park, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 679, 685–87 (Ct. App. 2005). 
 95. Wolf v. Rose Hill Cemetery Ass’n, 832 P.2d 1007, 1009 (Colo. App. 1991). 
 96. Spadaro v. Catholic Cemeteries, 330 N.W.2d 116, 118–19 (Minn. 1983). 
 97. Hood v. Spratt, 357 So. 2d 135, 137 (Miss. 1978). 
 98. Theodore v. Theodore, 259 P.2d 795, 797 (N.M. 1953). 
 99. Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 56 A. 878, 880 (Pa. 1904). 
 100. Maffei v. Woodlawn Mem’l Park, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 679, 685–86 (Ct. App. 2005). 
 101. Wolf v. Rose Hill Cemetery Ass’n, 832 P.2d 1007, 1009 (Colo. App. 1991). 
 102. Theodore, 259 P.2d at 795. 
 103. Spadaro v. Catholic Cemeteries, 330 N.W.2d 116, 118–19 (Minn. 1983). 
 104. FRIEDMAN, supra note 31, at 125. 
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A. Intention 
American law is deeply attentive to fulfilling the expressed will of the de-
cedent on matters reasonably within the decedent’s control. 105 Through wills 
and trusts, for example, people have considerable power of “testimonial dis-
position,” directing to whom one’s property will go, how it should get there, 
and—to some extent—how that property can be used. This right of testimo-
nial disposition has been described as “one of the most essential sticks in the 
bundle of rights.” 106 The default rule, with some important exceptions, is that 
most property is posthumously transferable. 107 As the Supreme Court ex-
pressed in Hodel v. Irving, “In one form or another, the right to pass on prop-
erty—to one’s family in particular—has been part of the Anglo-American 
legal system since feudal times.” 108 And as one 1856 South Carolina court put 
it, “Few rights are regarded with so much jealousy as the right of testamentary 
disposition of one’s own property . . . .” 109 
The American legal system also gives significant weight to decedents’ di-
rectives about their interment. In the words of a New York court in 1880, 
“[T]he dead themselves now have rights, which are committed to the living to 
protect,” including “the undisturbed rest of their own remains.” 110 This is not to 
say these desires or testaments are always followed; sometimes other interests 
take precedent. 111 But it is nonetheless an indispensably important interest 
that American law regularly takes into account when enforcing death rights. “A 
person has the right to control the disposition of his or her own remains with-
out the predeath or postdeath consent of another person,” avers a Washington 
statute. 112 Statutes in Oklahoma and South Dakota have similar language. 113 In-
deed, laws respecting decedents’ express wishes as to interment are quite com-
mon. 114 
 
 105. Professor Gilden calls this the “freedom of disposition model.” See Gilden, supra note 
31, at 333. 
 106. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987). 
 107. Horton, supra note 31, at 577. 
 108. 481 U.S. at 716. 
 109. Burton v. Yeldell, 30 S.C. Eq. (9 Rich. Eq.) 9, 15 (1856). 
 110. Thompson v. Hickey, 8 Abb. N. Cas. 159, 167 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1880). 
 111. See, e.g., Shipley Estate, 49 Pa. D. & C.2d 331 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1970). In that case, a de-
ceased man’s will stated his desire to be buried in Tennessee near his extramarital paramour. But 
his wife, who was in Pennsylvania, wished for him to be buried in that state instead. A court 
ruled in favor of the wife, citing the decedent’s deceit. “[B]ecause of the deceitful double life in 
which decedent encased himself, it is apparent to this court that he forfeited any right that he 
may have had to have his desires as to his burial honored, since such desires conflict with those 
of his lawful widow.” Id. at 338. See also Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE 
L.J. 781, 784 (2005) (“[M]any American courts have rejected the notion that an owner has the 
right to destroy that which is hers, particularly in the testamentary context.”). 
 112. WASH. REV. CODE § 68.50.160 (2020). 
 113. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1151 (2020); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-26-1 (2011). 
 114. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-102 (2018); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7100.1 
(West 2007); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-19-104 (2020); D.C. CODE § 3-413 (2021); DEL. CODE tit. 
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B. Relationship 
When assessing the weight of posthumous legal interests, another core 
variable is the relationship between the living person(s) and the decedent. 
That is, what was the relationship between the person who died, and the per-
son seeking to act toward, or on behalf of, the dead person? The nature of this 
relationship influences two types of legal consequences. First, it can determine 
the scope of the living person’s legal agency to act toward, or on behalf of, the 
decedent. 115 Second, some relationships can create certain legal obligations to 
act toward, or on behalf of, the decedent. The most important categories of 
these relationships are kinship, contract, control, and shared community. 
1. Kinship 
Familial ties are an important feature of posthumous legal interests. After 
death, kinship helps shape the disposition of one’s property, body, and privacy 
interests. For estates, the familial role is most acute when a person dies intes-
tate. That is, laws specify how assets are to be distributed either when someone 
dies without a will or when some portion of the decedent’s estate is not cov-
ered by a will. Spouses tend to be highest in the distributional chain in this 
scenario, followed by children. 116 In the absence of either, intestate distribu-
tion often includes other kin, such as parents, siblings, and grandchildren. 117 
Even when a person does have a will, kinship still matters in some circum-
stances. All but one state protects spouses even when they are not included 
expressly in a will. The most common method is through what is called an 
“elective share,” in which some percentage of the property is distributed to a 
spouse before the remainder of the will is honored. 118 Over the past century, 
the law in this area reflects an increased protection for spouses, in relation to 
a previously privileged role for offspring. Lawrence Friedman has called this 
“the shift from emphasis on the bloodline family to the family of affection and 
 
12, § 264 (2021); IDAHO CODE § 54-1139 (2017); IND. CODE § 29-2-19-9 (2020); MD. CODE 
ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 5-509 (LexisNexis Supp. 2020); MINN. STAT. § 149A.80 (2020); NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 38-1426 (2016); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1151 (2020); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.130 (2019); 20 
PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 305(a) (West Supp. 2020); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-26-1 
(2011); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 711.002(g) (West 2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, 
§ 9702(a)(16) (2017); WASH. REV. CODE § 68.50.160 (2020); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-17-101 (2021). 
 115. Cf. Gilden, supra note 31, at 340 (“Emotional and cultural legacies accordingly do not 
require planning; they require stewardship.”). 
 116. See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-102 (amended 2019), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 28 (Supp. 2020) 
(describing spouse’s share); id. § 2-103, 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 30 (describing other heirs); TEX. EST. CODE 
ANN. § 201.001 (West 2020). But see GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-1(c)(1) (2021) (providing that the 
spouse’s share be the same as the children’s share, but not less than one-third). 
 117. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-103 (amended 2019), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 30–32. 
 118. See Jeffrey N. Pennell, Individuated Determination of a Surviving Spouse’s Elective 
Share, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2473 (2020). 
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dependence.” 119 He attributed this shift to changes in American family struc-
tures. Other scholars have attributed this shift to the increased political, eco-
nomic, and cultural role of women in the United States. 120 
Kinship also plays a paramount role in terms of one protecting one’s 
body. This is most apparent when it comes to a decedent’s interment. At the 
common law, unless a decedent’s wish was “strongly and recently expressed,” 
the wish of a surviving spouse was paramount. 121 And if unmarried, “the right 
[to dispose of remains] is in the next of kin in the order of their relation to the 
decedent, as children of proper age, parents, brothers and sisters, or more dis-
tant kin, modified, it may be, by circumstances of special intimacy or associa-
tion with the decedent.” 122 State laws across the country continue to hold that 
when the decedent has not specified their preferred method of interment in 
writing, it is close kin who decide. 123 Here, too, spouses tend to be considered 
the closest kin in this scenario, followed by other kin such as children, parents, 
and siblings. Families are also centered with regard to disinterment. 124 
This control over interment includes the right to sue when someone inter-
feres. 125 Moreover, family members are sometimes centered in criminal laws 
banning the abuse of a corpse, given that the Model Penal Code recommends 
the prohibition of conduct that “would outrage ordinary family sensibilities.” 126 
Familial relationships also create obligations toward dead bodies. Under 
Alaska law, “Every needy person . . . shall be given a decent burial by the 
spouse, children, parents, grandparents, grandchildren, or siblings of the 
needy person, if they, or any of them, have the ability to do so, in the order 
named.” 127 Even more directly, there are criminal laws against “abandonment” 
or “concealment” of dead bodies in ways that make it impossible for them to 
be interred properly. 128 And as the 2002 Missouri case of State v. Bratina ex-
emplifies, families tend to have particular duties not to abandon their kin. 129 
In Bratina, a man was charged with abandonment for failing to report the 
 
 119. FRIEDMAN, supra note 31, at 19 (emphases omitted). 
 120. RONALD CHESTER, FROM HERE TO ETERNITY? PROPERTY AND THE DEAD HAND 75 
(2007); Mark L. Ascher, But I Thought the Earth Belonged to the Living, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1149, 
1152 (2011) (reviewing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS, 
TRUSTS, AND INHERITANCE LAW (2009)). 
 121. Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 56 A. 878, 880 (Pa. 1904); MARSH, supra note 31, at 9. 
 122. Pettigrew, 56 A. at 880. 
 123. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-102(d)(1) (2018); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§ 7100 (West 2007); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-19-106 (2020); MO. REV. STAT. § 194.119 (2016); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 290:16 (2016); VA. STAT. ANN. § 54.1-2807.01 (2019). 
 124. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1365.02 (2016); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. 
§ 711.004 (West Supp. 2020). 
 125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 (AM. L. INST. 1979). 
 126. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.10 (AM. L. INST. 1962). 
 127. ALASKA STAT. § 47.25.230 (2020). 
 128. TORCIA, supra note 18, § 524 (“At common law, it is a nuisance to fail to provide a 
decent burial for a person to whom the defendant owes such a duty.”). 
 129. 73 S.W. 3d 625 (Mo. 2002) (en banc). 
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death of his dead wife, and leaving her in their home. He argued that the state’s 
abandonment statute was unconstitutionally vague. The challenged law stated 
that “[a] person commits the crime of abandonment of a corpse if that person 
abandons, disposes, deserts or leaves a corpse without properly reporting the 
location of the body to the proper law enforcement officials in that county.” 130 
The court concluded that the law was sufficiently clear that close kin have a 
duty to report deaths promptly. 131 “The concept of ‘abandonment’ in the stat-
ute,” the court explained, “clearly is based upon a person having an interest 
in, or duty with respect to, the body.” 132 “Bratina is not a mere bystander. The 
body is that of his wife, the body was in his household, and he is the next of 
kin,” the court reasoned. 133 
Furthermore, families are authorized to protect the privacy interests of 
the dead. On questions of medical privacy, families have the power to object 
to the release of information about their kin under federal regulations and un-
der state law. 134 In addition, some states have recognized various notions of 
privacy that prevent the unauthorized distribution of photographic images of 
a corpse. In Reid v. Pierce County, the Washington Supreme Court permitted 
families to sue a county for invasion of privacy for publicly displaying photo-
graphs of their kin’s corpses without authorization. 135 And in State v. Condon, 
the Ohio Court of Appeals upheld the conviction of a photographer who, 
without permission, took photographs of dead bodies in a morgue with the 
intention of making them public. 136 The outcome in Condon might have been 
different, however, if the photographer had obtained permission from the 
family (or from the predeath consent of the dead subjects). The Court of Ap-
peals explained, 
Had Condon been able, therefore, to devise a means of obtaining either legal 
authorization or the consent causa mortis of his subjects (or perhaps even 
the posthumous consent of their families), he would have been free to ex-
press himself by taking the pictures that he did. Condon, however, did not 
receive authorization, nor did he receive the consent of the families of those 
whose bodies he chose to photograph. 137 
2. Control 
When the government exerts custodial control over a person in life, this 
sometimes creates legal obligations that persist in death. The clearest example 
 
 130. Bratina, 73 S.W.3d at 626. 
 131. Id. at 627–28. 
 132. Id. at 627. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2020); Weaver v. Myers, 229 So. 3d 1118, 1127–32 (Fla. 2017). 
 135. 961 P.2d 333, 335 (Wash. 1998) (en banc). 
 136. State v. Condon, 789 N.E.2d 696 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003). 
 137. Id. at 703. 
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is the state’s duties to deceased prisoners. 138 These include informing family 
members of the death and providing a decent interment if the family is unable 
to do so. Under California law, for example, when a person dies in confine-
ment and the family does not take possession of the body, the state “shall dis-
pose of the body by cremation or burial.” 139 Arizona law is also illustrative. 
When a family is unwilling to provide for “the burial or other funeral and dis-
position arrangements, or cannot be located on reasonable inquiry,” the duty 
falls on the state. 140 This approach is common across the United States. 141 
Moreover, federal law provides for the “care and disposition of the remains of 
prisoners of war and interned enemy aliens who die while in . . . custody,” in-
cluding by paying the expenses of notifying kin or providing for a burial. 142 
3. Contract 
Contracts also confer a significant degree of agency to act toward, or on 
behalf of, the dead. A particularly common example of this is health-care di-
rectives wherein individuals designate agents to control their interment in 
death. 143 Thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia have such stat-
utes. 144 For example, Indiana law allows a designated agent to “[m]ake plans 
for the disposition of the principal’s body, including executing a funeral plan-
ning declaration on behalf of the principal.” 145 Perhaps because it represents 
the will of the decedent, this authority supersedes others’ attempts to direct 
the disposition of the body, including that of family members. 146 
Some obligations toward the dead arise by means of express and implied 
contracts to perform personal services, such as funeral services and burials. 147 
Those with a contractual obligation toward the decedent sometimes enforce 
that authority through litigation. In the Yome case, for example, when a widow 
 
 138. See, e.g., Robyn Ross, Laid to Rest in Huntsville, TEX. OBSERVER (Mar. 11, 2014, 11:34 
AM), https://www.texasobserver.org/prison-inmates-laid-rest-huntsville [perma.cc/ERX2-
MM2U]. 
 139. CAL. PENAL CODE § 5061 (West 2011). 
 140. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-831 (Supp. 2020). 
 141. See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10A:16-7.5 (2021); N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF CORR. & CMTY. 
SUPERVISION, DIRECTIVE NO. 4013, INCARCERATED INDIVIDUAL DEATHS-ADMINISTRATIVE 
RESPONSIBILITY 7–9 (2020), https://doccs.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2021/09/4013.pdf 
[perma.cc/9TYY-VLU9]; VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-309.2 (2018). 
 142. 10 U.S.C. § 1483. 
 143. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-13-11 (LexisNexis 2019); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-
102(b)(1)(A) (2018); DEL. CODE tit. 12, § 262 (2021); IND. CODE § 30-5-5-16 (2020); NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 451.024(1)(a) (2019); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.130 (2019). 
 144. MARSH, supra note 31, at 47. 
 145. IND. CODE § 30-5-5-16. 
 146. See ALA. CODE § 34-13-11. 
 147. MARSH, supra note 31, at 75. 
November 2021] On Time, (In)equality, and Death 219 
attempted to disinter her husband, the religious order that opposed this at-
tempt had signed a contract with the decedent. 148 Much more recently, in Al-
cor Life Extension Foundation v. Richardson, 149 an Iowa court ordered, over a 
family’s objection, the disinterring of a body. The plaintiff was a company that 
had signed a contract with the decedent to cryogenically freeze his body. 
With this authority to protect the decedent also comes legal obligations 
to do the same. Failure to use reasonable care when engaging in contractually 
obligated services can give rise to liability by way of tort or contract theories. 150 
Plaintiffs have relied on these theories to sue contractors for failing to properly 
transport a corpse, as well as negligently embalming or handling a body for bur-
ial. 151 In Guth v. Freeland, for example, plaintiffs sued a mortuary for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress when, in violation of a written contract, the mor-
tuary failed to refrigerate their parent’s body prior to an open-casket funeral. 152 
4. Community 
In at least three respects, a person’s legal relationship to a decedent is also 
shaped by their shared community. First, local governments are legally tasked 
with providing decent burials for indigent and unclaimed individuals who die 
within their jurisdiction. 153 Under New Hampshire law, for example, 
“[w]henever a person in any town is poor and unable to support himself, he 
shall be relieved and maintained by the overseers of public welfare of such 
town, whether or not he has residence there.” 154 Georgia law similarly pro-
vides that when a decedent and “his or her family, and his or her immediate 
kindred are indigent and unable to provide for the decedent’s decent inter-
ment or cremation,” counties shall fund or reimburse the interment or cre-
mation. 155 
Second, individuals have common social duties to avoid treating the dead 
in ways that would outrage communities or undermine public health. States 
outlaw mutilation, necrophilia, grave-robbing, grave desecration, and other 
 
 148. Yome v. Gorman, 152 N.E. 126, 127–28 (N.Y. 1926); see supra notes 67–69 and ac-
companying text. 
 149. 785 N.W.2d 717, 730 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010). 
 150. Allison E. Butler, Cause of Action Against Undertaker for the Mishandling of Human 
Remains, in 35 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 495, 533–34, § 17 (2007). 
 151. See id. at 518–19. 
 152. 28 P.3d 982 (Haw. 2001). 
 153. Mary Ann Barton, Undertakers of Last Resort: Indigent Burials on the Rise, Denting 
County Budgets, NACO (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.naco.org/articles/undertakers-last-resort-
indigent-burials-rise-denting-county-budgets [perma.cc/WK65-WT86]. 
 154. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 165:1 (2014); see also id. § 611-B:25 (Supp. 2020) (requiring that 
unclaimed bodies be “decently bur[ied] or cremate[d]” by the authority of local public officials). 
 155. GA. CODE ANN. § 36-12-5 (2019). 
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conduct likely to outrage community sensibilities 156 or undermine the com-
munity’s physical health. 157 For example, when the State of Tennessee codified 
the common law crime of abandonment in 1858, the law initially read: “Any 
person who wilfully and unnecessarily, and in an improper manner, inde-
cently exposes, throws away, or abandons any human body or the remains 
thereof, in any public place, or in any river, stream, pond, or other place, is 
guilty of a misdemeanor.” 158 The state later upgraded this crime to a felony. 159 
In 1981, the Tennessee Supreme Court observed that the locations identified 
in this statute were places that either “offended the public’s sense of decency” 
or “exposed the public to the danger of contagious diseases or contamination 
of drinking water.” 160 
Third, with limited success, members of groups that have experienced vi-
olent subordination sometimes attempt to protect the interests of dead mem-
bers of that group, relying on their shared tribal, ethnic, or cultural heritage. 
The most prominent example of this is the Native American Graves Protec-
tion and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), under which federally recognized In-
dian tribes may request that federal agencies, as well as institutions receiving 
federal funds, return culturally affiliated human remains. 161 NAGPRA is sup-
plemented by the National Museum of the American Indian Act, which in-
cludes similar provisions applicable to Smithsonian museums. 162 
C. Motive and Fault 
When a living person or institution acts toward a dead person, motive 
and culpability also influence what conduct is deemed legally (and, likely, cul-
turally) acceptable. At least four features of this phenomenon merit particular 
mention: remuneration, deception, mode of culpability, and forfeiture. That 
is, the law looks with particular suspicion upon exploiting dead persons for 
profit, deceptive acts, knowingly or recklessly harmful acts, and actions taken 
by a dead person’s killer. 
 
 156. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-113 (2020); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 711-1107 
(LexisNexis 2016); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5509 (West 2015); W. VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 61-8-14 (LexisNexis 2020); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.01(B) (LexisNexis 2019). 
 157. State v. Vestal, 611 S.W.2d 819, 823 (Tenn. 1981) (Drowota, J., dissenting). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 821 (majority opinion). 
 161. 28 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3013. 
 162. 20 U.S.C. §§ 80q to 80q-15. 
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1. Remuneration 
“Don’t, for the sake of money, disturb the dead.” 163 Or so urged Michael 
Leventhal, the head of a preservation group based in Prince George’s County, 
Maryland, when MGM sought to disinter bodies from a colonial cemetery to 
build a new casino. 164 Legal action by Black descendants of those buried in 
that cemetery proved unsuccessful. 165 But the principle expressed by Le-
venthal is often reflected in the law of the dead. When a living person attempts 
to profit on the back of a dead person’s body or image, this appears to signifi-
cantly increase the likelihood that courts will deem the behavior unlawful. 
This observation especially holds when neither the decedent nor her family 
has authorized the exploitation. 
In the 1949 case Baker v. State, for example, the State of Arkansas con-
victed an elderly man’s sole caregiver for indecently handling a corpse when, 
over the course of several days, she arranged his body in various positions so 
that passersby would think he was alive. 166 The caregiver then cashed his dis-
ability check when it arrived days after he died, keeping the proceeds for her-
self. 167 These facts were sufficient to sustain a conviction and fine for 
indecently handling a dead body. The court analogized to a case from the Eng-
lish common law in which a court found that a jailor could be prosecuted for 
holding a deceased prisoner’s body and “refus[ing] to surrender it for proper 
burial until paid some claimed demand.” 168 The Baker court reasoned that 
“the jury could reasonably have concluded from the evidence that [the defend-
ant] held the body . . . and had it placed in positions simulating life until she 
received the welfare check.” 169 
More recently, in Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, families sued the County 
of Los Angeles because their “deceased family members had corneal tissue 
taken from them and sold for profit without the knowledge or consent of their 
next of kin.” 170 By the time of the suit, an eye bank had been giving about 
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$250,000 annually to the chief medical examiner’s office in exchange for cor-
neal tissue from dead bodies in their care. 171 A 1997 Los Angeles Times article 
reported that the office made $1 million from the practice. 172 In the subse-
quent federal lawsuit, the families contended that these actions by the county’s 
medical examiner constituted a wrongful deprivation of the families’ liberty 
and property interests in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Ninth 
Circuit agreed, observing that “[d]uties to protect the dignity of the human 
body after its death are deeply rooted in our nation’s history.” 173 
This antiremuneration principle is also supported by the California case 
of People v. Reid. 174 In March 2012, Marc Reid stole nine urns containing hu-
man remains. He then then discarded the remains “so he could recycle the 
metal urns in which they were laid to rest for scrap value.” 175 He was convicted 
of theft and disinterring human remains. 176 In sustaining the conviction, the 
California Supreme Court noted that the law was sensitive to the outrage and 
offense of survivors. The court cited, among other cases, the 1901 case of Peo-
ple v. Baumgartner, which called the act of breaking into grave and searching 
a dead person for money “highly reprehensible.” 177 
Additional evidence of the role of remuneration can be found in National 
Archives & Records Administration v. Favish. 178 In rejecting a request for the 
public release of a former presidential aide’s corpse, the court observed that 
the family had been besieged by requests from “[p]olitical and commercial 
opportunists” who sought “to profit from Foster’s suicide.” 179 The court con-
cluded that “[f]amily members have a personal stake in honoring and mourn-
ing their dead and objecting to unwarranted public exploitation that, by 
intruding upon their own grief, tends to degrade the rites and respect they 
seek to accord to the deceased person who was once their own.” 180 
2. Deception 
Deception is also a common feature of cases in which a living person’s 
actions toward or on behalf of the dead are deemed unlawful. Deceit is often a 
feature, for example, of cases finding that a criminal or civil defendant has en-
gaged in outrageous, offensive, or indecent conduct. When Natalee Holloway’s 
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mother was misled to believe that an animal’s remains were plausibly her daugh-
ter’s, the deceptive nature of the defendant’s actions played a key role in the 
court’s finding that the alleged conduct was legally “outrageous.” 181 The court 
explained that the “[d]efendants essentially took advantage of her grief and 
tireless efforts to find her daughter’s remains by baiting her with false hope for the 
benefit of a television series.” 182 The court further reasoned that the “[d]efend-
ants subjected Ms. Holloway to a sham that took advantage of her grief.” 183 
Similarly, in 1995, a Kansas court found that a nurse behaved outra-
geously when she lured a family into signing an organ-donation form based 
on false pretenses, then used the form to engage in far more invasive mutila-
tion than the family contemplated. 184 The family was led to believe that the 
decedent’s corneas and bone marrow would be extracted. Instead, the hospital 
removed his eyes and major bones from his arms, hips, and legs. In determin-
ing that a “person looking at this situation could exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’ ” the 
court explained that the nurse plausibly “exploited a position of trust and re-
spect gained from a[n] emotionally vulnerable family.” 185 “This deception,” 
the court found, “resulted in not only the mutilation of Kenneth’s remains but 
frustrated the family’s effort to act as a guardian over the remains and donate 
only what they believed Kenneth would have wanted.” 186 
Moreover, there is a rarely invoked tradition in the United States of crim-
inally banning false statements against the dead. 187 In 1808, a Massachusetts 
court held that it was unlawful “to blacken the memory of one dead . . . and 
expose him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule.” 188 Today, seven states 
criminalize defamation of the dead. 189 A Kansas law, for example, states that 
“criminal false communication” includes “communicating such information 
[that the person] knows to be false and will tend to . . . degrade and vilify the 
memory of one who is dead and to scandalize or provoke surviving relatives 
and friends.” 190 Similarly, Oklahoma law defines criminal defamation of the 
dead as “a false or malicious unprivileged publication” that is “designed to 
blacken or vilify the memory of one who is dead, and tending to scandalize his 
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surviving relatives or friends.” 191 These laws are rarely enforced, perhaps due 
to the First Amendment implications of applying the law broadly. 192 
Deception also plays a role in the law of trusts and estates. When fraud 
induces the creation of a living will, would-be heirs may contest the will. In 
some cases, heirs argue that someone lied about the document, deceiving the 
decedent about what she was signing. In other cases, purported heirs argue 
that someone lied to the testator about a fact to persuade the testator to create 
or sign a will. Lawrence Friedman has observed, however, that these types of 
cases are also rare. 193 
3. Mode of Culpability 
As is generally true in American civil and criminal law, the living actor’s 
mode of culpability also matters. 194 Knowingly or purposefully causing harm 
is more likely to violate the law than negligently causing harm. The tort of 
outrage or intentional infliction of emotional distress, for example, requires 
that “the conduct complained of must be intentional or reckless.” 195 In many 
jurisdictions, for an actor to violate criminal prohibitions against desecration, 
it must be shown that the actor “knows [the conduct] will outrage the sensi-
bilities of persons likely to observe or discover his action or its result.” 196 
Moreover, some state laws that criminally proscribe the mutilation or aban-
donment of a dead body require a showing that the defendant acted with an 
“intent to conceal a crime.” 197 
Indeed, law regarding posthumous interests sometimes expressly turns 
on the fact that grossly negligent, reckless, and wanton acts and omissions are 
often deemed more consequential than merely negligent ones. In Delaware, 
for example, in order to hold a funeral home liable “for the mishandling or 
mistreatment of a corpse,” one “must allege something more than mere neg-
ligent conduct.” 198 Such a finding requires “an extreme departure from the 
ordinary standard.” 199 To recover for such a cause of action in Florida, one 
must prove willful, wanton, or malicious behavior by the defendant. 200 And in 
Ohio, recovery requires a showing that the defendant “acted with a perverse 
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disregard of the risk.” 201 One may not recover for a mere “regrettable and un-
fortunate mistake.” 202 Additionally, Pennsylvania courts do not recognize 
negligent mishandling of the body, instead only authorizing suits for inten-
tional or wanton mishandling. 203 
4. Forfeiture 
Committing homicide extinguishes one’s legal ability to act toward, or on 
behalf of, the victim. Virtually every state has a “slayer rule,” which prevents 
killers from inheriting the decedent’s estate. 204 Under Georgia law, for exam-
ple, “An individual who feloniously and intentionally kills or conspires to kill 
or procures the killing of another individual forfeits the right to take an inter-
est from the decedent’s estate and to serve as a personal representative or trus-
tee of the decedent’s estate or any trust created by the decedent.” 205 And under 
Pennsylvania law, “No slayer shall in any way acquire any property or receive 
any benefit as the result of the death of the decedent . . . .” 206 Further, in many 
states, the killer forfeits the ability to determine the disposition of the victim’s 
human remains. 207 
III. THE ROLE OF TIME AND INHUMANITY 
Children sold away from me, husband sold, too. 
No safety, no love, no respect was I due. 
Langston Hughes 208 
This Part applies the principles extracted in Part II to the discoveries of 
the bodies, burial sites, and images of systemically dominated persons. What 
happens when, in this context, one looks to traditional considerations like in-
tentions, relationships, motive, and fault? Two consequences follow. First, 
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these considerations can, and do, inform ethical, cultural, and legal claims 
when the bodies, burial sites, and exploitative images of victims of prior gen-
erations’ mass horrors reenter our consciousness. Second, these traditional 
considerations are nonetheless not fully up to the task of answering questions 
about what constitutes respectful treatment of these victims. Time and ine-
quality complicate efforts to lift up decedents’ intentions, honor relationships, 
and avoid ratifying exploitation. How do we think about a decedent’s inten-
tions when the decedent’s intentions were thwarted and negated by forced co-
lonial rule, brutality, family separation, and erasure? How do we think about 
the institution’s “relationship” to the decedent when that relationship was 
constructed and enforced by systemic theft, kidnapping, and coercion? And 
how do we think of the motive and fault of an institution with wealth and 
prestige built on racist exploitation centuries ago that now, perhaps earnestly, 
insists it will afford “respect” to the bodies and images of the people it exploited? 
A. Intention 
On matters of property and burial, American law generally takes the clear, 
good-faith intentions of testators seriously. 209 And this same consideration 
features prominently in cultural debates when the remains of victims of mass 
horrors are discovered. In the late 1990s, for example, there was debate about 
how to repatriate and inter the brain of an indigenous man named Ishi, which 
was in the possession of the National Museum of Natural History. 210 A central 
consideration was “what Ishi himself would have wanted.” 211 Similarly, in 
2019, when Philadelphia pastor Jesse Wendell Mapson Jr. learned that a 
nearby burial site for escaped slaves was being regularly trampled over, he ap-
pealed to the probable intentions of those who were buried: “Everything un-
derneath was crying out, and I didn’t know.” 212 And when UGA dislodged 
slaves from their on-campus graves and moved them to a mass grave in a for-
merly all-white cemetery off-campus, Black local school board member Linda 
Davis questioned whether the slaves would have wanted to be buried in a mass 
grave next their former masters. She recommended instead, “[a]t some point,” 
reinterring them to another cemetery “with their descendants.” 213 Further, 
when students demanded that the University of Pennsylvania stop displaying 
slaves’ skulls in a museum, among the demands was to “[e]nd the use of data 
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sourced from the collection without consent and remove all images from the 
Museum’s digital footprint that represent the deceased without consent.”214 
But divining the intentions of these victims about their property, burial 
or disinterment is difficult. For indigenous persons and the enslaved, there 
was not a mere absence of expressed will; there was an active, sustained, sys-
temic negation of that will. A negation of one’s will is part of what it means to 
live under colonial rule or to live as a slave. In the 1823 case of Johnson v. 
M’Intosh, for example, the Supreme Court confronted whether tribal sales of 
land were entitled to legal recognition. 215 Holding that such sales lacked legal 
force, the Court reasoned that “the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country 
were fierce savages, whose occupation was war.”216 Eight years later, in Cher-
okee Nation v. Georgia, Chief Justice John Marshall further acknowledged that 
in a system of colonization, Natives lived in “territory to which we assert a title 
independent of their will.” 217 Asserting that title, the federal government and 
state militia used force to drive members of the Cherokee Nation westward, 
far from their homes and their ancestors’ burial grounds. 218 In Democracy in 
America, Alexis de Tocqueville describes observing indigenous persons mov-
ing westward on this forced pilgrimage, noting that some were “upon the 
verge of death” during the journey itself. 219 What followed was a period in 
which “Indian graves were routinely looted, with Indian goods exhumed and 
sold to museums and private collectors, many of them ending up in Europe.” 220 
What also followed is a century characterized by so many broken promises 
that in 1972, over a thousand indigenous persons marched in a caravan from 
the West Coast to Washington, D.C., to mark the “Trail of Broken Trea-
ties.” 221 
Slaves’ intentions were also routinely negated by law. Slaves could not, for 
example, enter marital contracts or pass property to heirs. 222 As the Alabama 
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Supreme Court expressed in Malinda v. Gardner, the marital relationship 
brings “duties and rights” that “are necessarily incompatible with the nature 
of slavery, as the one cannot be discharged, nor the other be recognized, with-
out doing violence to the rights of the owner.” 223 As legal scholar Adrienne 
Davis has explained in a deep and rich account of Gardner and related cases, 
“the enslaved were not entitled to the estates of their deceased companions, 
nor could their children exercise inheritance rights.” 224 And given that system 
of domination and erasure, when bodies of long-forgotten slaves are discov-
ered, unearthing their intentions is much more difficult than in the average 
legal case about contested wills or disputes about testamentary disposition. 
B. Relationship 
1. Kinship 
Appeals to kinship frequently characterize discourse about the remains of 
victims of mass horrors. 225 In response to the Trump Administration’s blast-
ing of indigenous burial grounds, Ned Norris Jr., the chairman of the Tohono 
O’odham Nation asked, “How would you feel if someone brought a bulldozer 
to your family graveyard and started uprooting the graves there?” “That is the 
relationship, the significance,” he added. 226 Similarly, when the executive di-
rector of the Virginia NAACP implored Virginia Commonwealth University 
to stop using a slave burial ground as a parking lot, he also made an appeal to 
ancestry: “We say get your asphalt off of our ancestors!” 227 And when Tamara 
Lanier asked Harvard to stop making use of the images of her enslaved ances-
tors, her complaint emphasized that she was “their descendant and the right-
ful owner of images taken without their consent.” 228 My own father’s pleas in 
Athens, Georgia, made similar appeals to kinship.229 Law helps inform and 
 
absence of legal recognition, enslaved persons created informal systems of property ownership 
and community). 
 223. 24 Ala. 719, 724 (1854) (enslaved party). 
 224. Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective, 51 
STAN. L. REV. 221, 240–41 (1999). 
 225. See supra Section II.B.1. 
 226. Erik Ortiz, Ancient Native American Burial Site Blasted for Trump Border Wall Con-
struction, NBC NEWS (Feb. 12, 2020, 6:13 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/an-
cient-native-american-burial-site-blasted-trump-border-wall-construction-n1135906 
[perma.cc/B7PU-VDUE]. 
 227. Scott Bass, El-Amin: VCU “Desecrating” Ancestors, STYLE WEEKLY (Sept. 29, 2010), 
https://www.styleweekly.com/richmond/el-amin-vcu-odesecrating-ancestors/Content?oid=
1379058 [perma.cc/ZE5Q-BD2K]. 
 228. Complaint & Jury Demand at 2, Lanier v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., No. 
1981CV00784 (Mass. Super. Ct. Middlesex Cnty. Mar. 1, 2021) (“Every day that Harvard main-
tains those positions compounds the injustices inflicted on Renty and Delia in its name, and 
further harms Ms. Lanier as their descendant and the rightful owner of images taken without 
their consent.”); see discussion infra Section V.C. 
 229. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
November 2021] On Time, (In)equality, and Death 229 
contextualize these moments, revealing the deep and sustained role of kinship 
in determining the proper treatment of the dead. 230 
Yet inequality complicates these appeals to kinship. Familial relationships 
among subordinated groups have been severely undermined in the United 
States through legal erasure and separation. By erasure, I mean failing to take 
cognizance of familial bonds, treating such bonds as worthless; by separation, 
I mean ways in which families were broken apart. Both concepts are mutually 
reinforcing. If bonds are treated as legally worthless, the opportunities for sep-
aration increase because of the absence of legal protections that would keep 
families together. And with separation comes fewer opportunities to protect 
those bonds. 
The separation and erasure of families defines much of the indigenous 
experience in the United States. After the federal government and states used 
mass physical violence to separate Natives from their sovereign territories, 231 
the federal government moved to more structural forms of violence. 232 Begin-
ning in the late nineteenth century, the federal government instituted a policy 
of removing Native American children from their families across the United 
States. 233 The goal of this family separation was to “kill the Indian in order to 
save the man.” 234 One scholar has called this practice, which lasted for over a 
half century, “education for extinction.” 235 Congress recognized in 1978 that 
“there is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and integrity 
of Indian tribes than their children,” yet “an alarmingly high percentage of 
[Indian] children [were] placed in non-Indian . . . adoptive homes.” 236 These 
separations were devastating. 
In the context of slavery, legal erasure is exemplified by the legal doctrine 
of partus sequitur ventrem. 237 Under that doctrine, the offspring of enslaved 
mothers belonged to the owner. 238 In the case of Esther v. Akins’ Heirs, for 
example, a slave master willed that some of his female slaves were to become 
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free at the age of 23. 239 The testator’s will did not explicitly include those fe-
male slaves’ children, thereby “doom[ing] Esther, Dudley, and Nancy Jane to 
slavery, because, at their births, their mothers were slaves, and the will con-
tains no provision as to themselves.” 240 Likewise, the Gardner case, discussed 
in Section III.A, further amplifies this point. Being born into slavery meant 
that the would-be heirs in that case lacked, in the words of the court, “inher-
itable blood.” 241 
Families were routinely separated under this system of chattel slavery. 242 
Firsthand accounts bring this practice to life. A former slave from Alabama 
reported: “Babies was snatched from their mothers’ breasts and sold to spec-
ulators. Children was separated from sisters and brothers and never saw each 
other again. . . . I could tell you about it all day, but even then you couldn’t 
guess the awfulness of it.” 243 In an 1846 interview, when former slave Lewis 
Clark of Kentucky was asked about kinship under slavery, he replied, “I never 
knew a whole family to live together till all were grown up in my life.” 244 In 
1849, a former slave named Henry Bibb described in graphic detail a brutal 
scene of mother and children being separated under chattel slavery: “But the 
child was torn from the arms of its mother amid the most heart-rending 
shrieks from the mother.” 245 A witness to a slave auction later described in a 
New Deal–era interview how “[n]ight and day, you could hear men and 
women screaming . . . ma, pa, sister or brother . . . taken without any warn-
ing,” and how “[p]eople was always dying from a broken heart.” 246 
For Blacks and indigenous persons, American institutions have systemi-
cally interrupted and impaired the kinds of bonds of kinship that the law pre-
supposes are generally intact. American law tends to make families trustees 
for the dead when the decedent’s intentions have not been clearly expressed. 
But legal erasure and family separations have had enduring effects that per-
petually frustrate lineal descendants’ ability to perform this trustee role. In the 
African American experience, early evidence of this enduring effect came in 
the immediate aftermath of the Civil War, as families looked for one another 
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in their newfound freedom. Historian Heather Andrea Williams has docu-
mented and described the ubiquitous correspondence and newspaper ads of 
freedmen looking for their kin. 247 This 1865 ad from the Colored Tennessean 
is representative: 248 
As former slave Sarah Fitzgerald put it, “After the war closed all the Ne-
groes was looking around for their own folks. Husbands looking for their 
wives, and wives looking for their husbands, children looking for parents, par-
ents looking for children, everything sure was scrambled up in them days.” 249 
Despite their efforts, most freed slaves never reunited with their relatives. 250 
Indeed, their efforts were stymied by the fact that slaves had no legally recog-
nized surnames. 251 Moreover, an enslaved person’s unofficial surname 
tracked (and changed with) that of their master. 252 
Postwar legal and political erasure persisted in ways that further under-
mined the ability of the formerly enslaved to care for their kin. In the years 
after Reconstruction, Black Americans were unable to protect their interests 
through the political process because of violent white supremacist mobs and 
laws that all but foreclosed voting by Black Americans in meaningful numbers 
in some states until 1965. 253 During this era of suppressed political will, segre-
gated and disrespected burial sites for Black Americans proved common. 254 
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One example of this can be found at Oakland Cemetery in Atlanta.255 The 
cemetery contains the graves of a number of elite Atlantans over the past cen-
tury and a half, Confederate insurrectionists who fought against the United 
States, and roughly 870 unknown persons buried in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury. 256 Aided by an 1852 ordinance that required that Blacks be segregated 
from whites, 257 when the cemetery expanded just after Reconstruction in 
1877, the Atlanta City Council ordered that the graves of Blacks be disinterred 
and relocated to make room for additional whites. 258 The names of those bur-
ied have been lost to history. 259 Notably, this treatment in death contrasts dra-
matically with that of the Confederate site on the same grounds; to this day, it 
is illegal under Georgia law to move memorials dedicated to the so-called 
“Confederate States of America.” 260 
The effects of this history are still felt. When slave burial grounds are dis-
covered, they serve as reminders of mass erasure and separation through dis-
possession, violence, chattel slavery, and political powerlessness. And kinship-
based legal protections are simply no match for this history. As law-and-hu-
manities scholar Mai-Linh Hong has explained, “For many African Ameri-
cans, circumstances arising from slavery have obscured family histories: for 
example, separation of slave families through sale; laws that prevented recog-
nition of slaves’ patrilineal descent; and the mass migrations that followed 
Emancipation.” 261 According to Hong and other legal scholars such as Mary 
L. Clark, this history means that in privileging kinship (and the inherited own-
ership of real property) in the protection of the dead, “the law does not inter-
vene equally on everyone’s behalf.” 262 
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2. Control 
Typically, a government’s custody over a group of human beings in-
creases the state’s legal obligations to them, 263 including after death. 264 And 
again, a history of subordination both informs and complicates discourse 
about how “control” interacts with respect for deceased victims of mass hor-
rors. In these debates, the arguments are rooted not so much in the view that 
control comes with obligations but the view that control, when wrongly in-
voked or obtained, 265 should not exist at all. 
Advocates and protestors commonly ask institutions to relinquish control 
of bodies and images obtained through exploitation and violence. In 2017, for 
example, the vice chairman of the Tohono O’odham Nation told the New York 
Times that the tribe was outraged that the United States government would 
deign to build a wall separating members from their ancestral lands.266 He ex-
plained, “If someone came into your house and built a wall in your living room, 
tell me, how would you feel about that?” 267 “This is our home,” he added. 268 
Relinquishing wrongly obtained control was also the demand of the stu-
dents who successfully petitioned the University of Pennsylvania to stop dis-
playing slaves’ bodies. In their view, exhibiting and keeping the skulls only 
“reproduces” the “white supremacist assumption[s]” of the past, namely, “that 
the descendants of enslaved Africans, and of Indigenous, Latinx, and Asian 
communities do not have the right to care for their own ancestors[] and that 
the desires of imperial knowledge-producers supersede the self-determination 
of Black and brown communities.” 269 Or as Georgia political leader and his-
torian Michael Thurmond explained during the episode at the University of 
Georgia, “UGA doesn’t own them in death.” 270 These are not requests to 
simply exercise better care. These are pleas to stop asserting power over people 
who are only in these institutions’ care because of brutality, exploitation, and 
caste—brutality that is incompatible with contemporary norms of respect. 
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3. Contract 
Contracts can enhance a person’s legal duties to the dead. 271 And contrac-
tual principles sometimes similarly inform cultural debates as to how to treat 
exploited victims of mass horrors. This is especially true in the context of Na-
tives, with whom the United States has entered into treaties and purports to 
have a “trust relationship.” 272 This “trust relationship” means that the United 
States has duties of loyalty and care toward indigenous persons. 273 In the con-
text of the border wall, the trust relationship has informed arguments about 
why destroying these burial sites is disrespectful. When construction in Feb-
ruary 2020 disturbed Arizona’s Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument and 
affected sacred burial sites, Congressman Raúl M. Grijalva of Arizona re-
minded the Department of Homeland Security about these obligations: “Reg-
ular and meaningful consultation with the Tohono O’odham Nation on the 
construction of a border wall and other issues identified by the tribe is essen-
tial to maintaining strong government-to-government relationships and ful-
filling the federal government’s trust responsibility.” 274 
Still, while the trust relationship has sometimes furnished meaningful ob-
ligations, Professor Seth Davis has offered trenchant, egalitarian critiques of 
this doctrine. 275 He has traced it to Chief Justice John Marshall’s infantilizing 
claim in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia that tribes’ “relation to the United States 
resembles that of a ward to his guardian” given that they were in “a state of 
pupilage.” 276 To avoid perpetuating these roots, Professor Davis urges incor-
porating into the doctrine principles that better empower indigenous persons 
and tribes. 277 
4. Community 
Shared community sometimes confers legal agency and obligations con-
cerning dead persons. 278 And this consideration also shapes cultural dis-
course. In Professor Hong’s detailed, thoughtful analysis of the protests 
against Virginia Commonwealth University’s use of a slave burial ground as a 
parking lot, she contextualizes the local Black community’s relationship to the 
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site. “[I]t is not uncommon,” she observed, “for a descendant of slaves today 
to identify with slave ‘ancestors’ through shared history and cultural heritage, 
rather than through documentable biological descent.” 279 Moreover, when 
tribes request the repatriation of human remains of their members, this is reg-
ularly described as bringing them “home.” 280 
Important American norms of equality, however, complicate claims of 
“shared community.” This is especially true in the context of race. Any legal 
privileging of shared racial community must face off with two common 
American conceptions of equality: anticlassification and antibalkanization.281 
By anticlassification, I reference the strand of constitutional jurisprudence 
that is hostile to any measure that classifies persons on the basis of race. 282 By 
antibalkanization, I reference Reva B. Siegel’s argument that the Supreme 
Court has often sought to preserve social cohesion by not unduly polarizing 
racial and ethnic groups. 283 Either or both of these norms could be under-
mined by emphasizing shared racial heritage in determining agency and obli-
gations for the dead. 
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Time also complicates claims of shared community. With time comes the 
basic biological decomposition of the body. 284 And with decomposition comes 
the irreversible loss of DNA that can link the decedent to living persons. 285 
And this means that more community members may have a plausible familial 
connection to the body than when specific biological links can be determined. 
With more people experiencing a connection, however, comes more likeli-
hood of disagreement. That is, different members of the community, with 
equal claims of shared bond, might have different perspectives about the best 
way to care for the dead person. Suppose some condone or request reinter-
ment in a well-manicured, formerly all-white cemetery, symbolically breaking 
with a history of apartheid and segregation. Suppose others demand that the 
bodies be left alone altogether, that their burial grounds be respected rather 
than dredged up and desecrated. And suppose others demand that the body 
be moved to a formerly all-Black cemetery if the burial ground is to be de-
stroyed, so that probable kin are close together. As time widens the range of 
people who might plausibly be counted as the decedent’s community, such 
disputes are likely to increase. 
C. Motive and Fault 
When it comes to the treatment of dead persons, American law is deeply 
concerned with motive and fault. 286 Remuneration, deception, culpability, 
and forfeiture all make a difference. 287 These considerations similarly color 
dialogue about how to treat deceased victims of mass horror. Tamara Lanier’s 
complaint against Harvard University, for example, condemns the univer-
sity’s “capitalization” on a “shameful legacy” and its doing so “at the expense 
of truth.” 288 This form of argumentation, common in our cultural discourse, 
links the contemporary treatment of slaves to chattel slavery’s deception, ava-
rice, intentional violence, and death. 
Yet the passage of time, historic inequality, and egalitarian norms again 
complicate this argument in two ways. First, motives and intentions can 
change over time. In the University of Pennsylvania example mentioned ear-
lier, the skulls on display were obtained by Samuel Morton without consent 
in order to perpetuate lies about racial superiority. 289 Indeed, they were an 
attempt to build on the theories of white supremacy perpetuated by Harvard 
professor Louis Agassiz, the very person who commissioned photographs of 
Tamara Lanier’s ancestors without their consent. 290 But roughly two hundred 
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years later, these elite institutions promise that their motives and goals are less 
sinister. In the summer of 2020, for example, when the University of Pennsyl-
vania disestablished the museum exhibition featuring stolen skulls of persons 
who died as slaves in Cuba centuries ago, the university acknowledged that 
“this museum was built on colonialism and racist narratives”291 but committed 
to working towards “repatriation or reburial” of these human skulls in an “eth-
ical and respectful manner.”292 And Harvard put together a commission several 
years ago to study slavery and untie itself from its historical relationship to it. 293 
Second, what is respectful, and what outrages the average community mem-
ber, can change dramatically over time. It was once the norm to treat Black dead 
bodies with radically different respect than white bodies. As one newspaper de-
scribed following a lynching of Sam Hose, for example, “Before the body was 
cool, it was cut to pieces, the bones were crushed into small bits, and even the 
tree upon which the wretch met his fate was torn up and disposed of as ‘souve-
nirs.’ ”294 When it comes to contemporary treatment of these very same bodies, are 
our conceptions of “outrage” capacious enough, and historically literate enough, 
to appreciate the unequal dishonor, destruction, and degradation these bodies 
already faced for centuries in life and in death? Should they be? Can they be? 
IV. THE ROLE OF TIME AND EQUALITY 
Then another century came. 
People like me forgot their names. 
Jericho Brown 295 
[T]he incommensurable weight of the unreckoning is pressing down. The heft of 
history is too heavy to toss aside, to float away. 
Cheryl I. Harris 296 
When a slave burial site was discovered in Philadelphia in 2019, journalist 
Michaela Winberg observed, “Most of us would probably argue it’s wrong to 
desecrate anyone’s grave, but when it comes to the generation in question—
African Americans who died in the mid-to late-1800s—many consider it es-
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pecially egregious. The forgotten black bones belonged to a generation of for-
mer slaves . . . .” 297 On this view, disrespecting the bodies of long-ago former 
slaves has special significance. It is a perspective that appears to be widely 
shared. When, as described previously, the University of Pennsylvania agreed 
to remove the skulls of fifty-three slaves from the Morton Cranial Museum, the 
University simultaneously decided to leave well over a thousand other skulls on 
display. 298 But what accounts for this disparate approach? As Part III reveals, 
traditional considerations (consent, relationship, motive, and fault) cannot en-
tirely explain the view that mistreating dead victims of identity-based mass hor-
rors is distinct (in kind or degree) from other forms of postdeath treatment. 
In navigating this puzzle, this Part will not focus on (eminently reasona-
ble) accounts of why it harms living persons to engage in unduly disrespectful 
or exploitative postures toward the bodies and images of slaves. One could 
argue, for example, that the mere fact that mistreating slaves provokes more 
outrage is enough reason for legal and policy intervention, given that protect-
ing public peace is an important goal of law. 299 Moreover, as I have written 
elsewhere, identity-based maltreatment of the dead can stigmatize, terrorize, 
and civically deflate living individuals who share that identity. 300 But the focus 
here is on a different question: How and why does this past injustice shape our 
intuitions about how slaves should be treated posthumously? When we lift the 
proverbial hood off of the heightened outrage that people express when those 
bodies and images are mistreated, what fuels the outrage? 
In this Part, I argue that America’s historically rooted collective memory 
is important in anchoring and orienting the nation’s cultural identity, that the 
shape of a people’s memory or legacy can be damaged posthumously, and that 
some groups’ legacies have faced subordination and disproportionate harm 
through legal erasure, familial separation, and starkly skewed information 
campaigns. In consequence, present-day individuals and institutions can en-
gage in conduct that posthumously harms these groups by reinforcing their 
marginal status in our nation’s memory and should seek to avoid this kind of 
posthumous subordination when dealing with the bodies, burial sites, and im-
ages of such groups. Legal, philosophical, and sociohistorical arguments syn-
ergistically buoy this thesis. 
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A. Law, Time and Equality 
1. Time After Death 
My prior work has defined “posthumous memory” as “the psychic im-
pression and influence that persons continue to occupy after death.” 301 Law 
protects three aspects of one’s individual memory after death. First, law pro-
tects memory as creation, allowing individuals’ families or estates to control 
how those creations may be used and whether the creator continues to receive 
attributive credit. That is, courts sometimes recognize the right of a dead per-
son’s family or estate “to control, preserve and extend his status and memory 
and to prevent unauthorized exploitation thereof by others,” while also ac-
knowledging that public figures leave an important impression on the public’s 
collective memory. 302 Second, the law has sometimes protected memory as 
reputation, by protecting privacy, prohibiting actions that “blacken the 
memory of [the] dead,” 303 and pardoning dead persons. 304 Third, law protects 
memory as dignity. For example, laws against desecration of human remains 
and graves reflect presumptive “respect . . . for the memory of the dead.”305 
Across all three dimensions, however, this individualized protection of 
one’s memory has something of a shelf life. 306 Copyright provides one exam-
ple of temporal limitations on protection of creations. Copyright law protects 
works that result from one’s authorship and original creative judgment. 307 It 
is impermissible to reproduce the protected aspects of such works without the 
permission of the author. 308 Still, this protection is not temporally boundless. 
Copyright protection generally lasts seventy years after the death of the au-
thor, 309 or ninety-five years from the date the copyright was originally secured 
for works created prior to 1978. 310 In addition to copyright protections, about 
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thirty states create a property interest in a person’s name or likeness, protect-
ing those interests from commercial exploitation without permission. 311 
About twenty-five states protect those interests posthumously. 312 But here too 
states often place temporal limitations on the posthumous application of the 
right. While these limits range from ten years to forever, 313 one federal court 
recently observed that the median is fifty years. 314 
There are also temporal limits on some protections for individualized 
memory in the context of reputational and dignitary interests. Posthumous 
defamation of the recently dead was a crime under the common law. 315 Today, 
Rhode Island law provides a cause of action for defamatory obituaries pub-
lished within three months of a person’s death. 316 The Health Insurance Port-
ability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule, promulgated by the 
Department of Health and Human Services, is another example of this kind 
of temporal limit. 317 That regulation protects individually identifiable health 
information for fifty years after a person’s death. 318 The Department has rea-
soned that this temporal choice “balances the privacy interests of surviving 
relatives and other individuals with a relationship to the decedent, with the 
need for archivists, biographers, historians, and others to access old or ancient 
records on deceased individuals for historical purposes.” 319 As the Depart-
ment explained when it adopted the fifty-year rule in 2013: 
We believe 50 years is an appropriate period of protection for decedent 
health information, taking into account the remaining privacy interests of 
living individuals after the span of approximately two generations have 
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passed, and the difficulty of obtaining authorizations from a personal repre-
sentative of a decedent as the same amount of time passes. 320 
Temporal limits also structure protections for some posthumous digni-
tary interests beyond privacy. This is illustrated by regulations concerning 
when a cemetery is deemed “abandoned,” which in some places subjects those 
buried there to a greater risk of disinterment. For example, in Arkansas, one 
condition that must be satisfied to demonstrate that a cemetery is abandoned 
is that “there have been no interments for a period of fifteen (15) years.” 321 
One consequence of such abandonment is that a state court may order re-
moval of the dead from the cemetery, so long as the petition for removal is 
published in the local newspaper. 322 
But while individualized protections for memory often diminish over 
time, protections in service of our collective memory tend to increase over 
time. By “collective memory,” I invoke the concept pioneered by French soci-
ologist Maurice Halbwachs. Drawing inspiration from Émile Durkheim, 323 
Halbwachs observed that “it is in society that people normally acquire their 
memories. It is also in society that they recall, recognize, and localize their 
memories.” 324 He contended that collective memory is “essentially a recon-
struction of the past [that] adapts the image of ancient facts to the beliefs and 
spiritual needs of the present.” 325 This construction happens, in part, through 
words 326 and traditions. 327 Collective memory is also constructed through 
law’s official narratives, 328 trials, 329 and even doctrines. 330 
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American law protects significant contributions to this shared set of soci-
etal recollections. Temporal limitations on the posthumous right to publicity, 
for example, are intended to protect the broader public’s ability to own and 
control the collective narratives through which they view the world. As one 
leading treatise has explained, one’s individual memory must at some point 
give way to free speech and our collective memory. 331 Put differently, “the per-
son’s identity should enter the public domain as a part of history and folklore.” 332 
Beyond intellectual property, historic-preservation laws represent per-
haps the best example of law providing more protection over time to physical 
structures and burial grounds. One of the most well-known features of the law 
of historic preservation is the “fifty-year rule.” 333 Under this rule, a structure 
is not eligible for inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places unless 
it is fifty years old or has achieved “exceptional importance.” 334 Additionally, 
a number of states provide special protection for cemeteries that are deemed 
historic. Under Hawaiʻi law, “[a]t any site, other than a known, maintained, 
actively used cemetery[,] where human skeletal remains are discovered or are 
known to be buried and appear to be over fifty years old, the remains and their 
associated burial goods shall not be moved without the [state’s] approval.” 335 
New Jersey law allows local governments to create a special fund for the “res-
toration, maintenance and preservation of any historic cemetery.” 336 And in 
Oregon, the Commission on Historic Cemeteries maintains a list of historic 
cemeteries, works to rehabilitate them, and is charged with “promot[ing] pub-
lic education relating to historic cemeteries.” 337 
2. Toward Equality After Death 
Throughout American history, institutions have engaged in the unequal 
treatment of dead bodies as a means of enforcing identity-based stratification. 
Segregated cemeteries were common in the colonies. 338 Scholars such as An-
gelika Krüger-Kahloula have observed that placing Blacks at the periphery of 
cemeteries alongside “paupers” and “criminals” during colonial times com-
municated their status at the “lowest rung of the ladder.” 339 This kind of seg-
regation lasted deep into the life of the Republic, including after the abolition 
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of slavery. Most starkly, state and local governments throughout the South 
enacted laws prohibiting integrated cemeteries in the late 1800s and early 
1900s. 340 For example, a Birmingham law banned “colored” paupers and 
white paupers from being buried in the same public grounds. 341 A Louisiana 
law went even further, dictating that Black and white corpses were to be trans-
ported in separate train cars. 342 Outside the South, racially restrictive cove-
nants were used to enforce segregation in cemeteries. 343 Until the 1960s, for 
example, one cemetery near Detroit enforced a covenant that required anyone 
buried there to be at least 75 percent white. 344 
Identity-based subordination after death has also affected people with dis-
abilities, including discrimination on the basis of HIV status. 345 In the mid-
1980s, at Hart Island in New York City, the unclaimed bodies of those who 
died of AIDS-related causes were initially segregated from the mass graves of 
other unclaimed dead. 346 Even after that practice abated, people with HIV 
were disproportionately among those who were placed in the mass graves at 
Hart Island. As a daughter of one of the persons buried there remarked, it was 
“a double indignity to die from such a stigmatized disease and then be buried 
in anonymity in a mass grave.” 347 During the same era, as Mark Wojcik doc-
uments, funeral homes often refused to serve, or placed unreasonable de-
mands on, families of those who died of AIDS-related causes. 348 These actions 
stigmatized the victims’ memory and communicated messages about their so-
cial position. 
Importantly, ameliorating inequality became one of the defining features 
of the law of the dead during the late nineteenth century and throughout the 
twentieth century. In 1893, for example, New York prohibited discrimination 
based on race in cemeteries, followed by New Jersey in 1898 and Illinois in 
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1935. 349 Federal civil rights statutes played a significant role in ending formal 
race-based discrimination in cemeteries, especially in the 1960s. 350 And later 
that century, federal and state laws served to redress discrimination against 
persons who died from AIDS-related complications. For example, in 1987, a 
New York court held that a law that prohibited public accommodations from 
discriminating against the “physically handicapped” applied “to those indi-
viduals who have died due to complications associated with the AIDS virus 
and to their family members who have been stigmatized by their association 
with the deceased.” 351 
3. Memory 
Embedded in these areas of law, then, are two guiding principles. First, 
the preservation of our collective memory is valuable. 352 Second, institutions 
should avoid subordinating the memory of the dead on the basis of race, eth-
nicity, and disability. And when these two principles blend together, they con-
tain fragments of a theory, linking contemporary egalitarian aspirations with 
a past that is rooted in inequality and brutality. If collective memory is valua-
ble, and the unequal treatment of marginalized persons’ memories is detesta-
ble, then what does this mean in a society that has, so often, mistreated 
marginalized individuals’ memories on the basis of their identity? When we 
discover unmarked cemeteries of indigenous persons and slaves, we are con-
fronted with unmistakable evidence of their subordination. Even if the subor-
dination initially happened long ago, their forgotten, neglected bodies serve 
as witnesses, testifying to their separate, unequal, subordinated role in our col-
lective consciousness. And once an institution is placed on notice, it is a cus-
todian of these unequally treated memories; its subsequent acts determine its 
complicity in the corruption of that memory. 
B. Posthumous Subordination 
1. Posthumous Harm 
It is, perhaps, enough to say that a nation should guard its collective 
memory because that memory is important to a society’s identity and destiny. 
But by invoking the notion of “complicity,” I mean to make a broader claim: 
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custodians’ treatment of the bodies and images of subjugated, stigmatized de-
ceased persons can render them complicit in additional harm to those victims. 
Inherent in that thesis is the controversial proposition that one generation can 
become complicit in perpetuating harms against an earlier generation. This is, 
at its foundation, a philosophical claim, and one that is inextricably in dia-
logue with philosophers who have reflected deeply about the viability of claims 
that rest on conceptions of posthumous harm. 
Indeed, one of the oldest debates in philosophy is whether a person can 
be harmed after death. “Being asked whether death was an evil thing,” the phi-
losopher Diogenes replied: “How can it be evil, when in its presence we are 
not aware of it?” 353 Epicurus reached a similar conclusion: “Death does not 
concern us, because as long as we exist, death is not here. And when it does 
come, we no longer exist.” 354 He famously proclaimed: “Death is nothing to 
us.”355 Or as German philosopher Max Horkheimer put it in 1937, “Past injuries 
took place in the past and the matter ended there. The slain are truly slain.”356 
In recent decades, philosophers and political theorists have offered per-
suasive rebuttals to these claims. 357 In 1984, George Pitcher wrote an influen-
tial and paradigm-shifting article in which he disaggregated life before death 
(“ante-mortem”) and after death (“post-mortem”). 358 He argued that events 
can transpire in death that impact the projects one pursued in life. Among 
other examples, he invited readers to imagine a father on his deathbed, whose 
son promises him that he will bury him in a family plot but then instead do-
nates his body to science. The betrayal is against the person to whom commit-
ments were made while he was alive. 359 “An ante-mortem person can be 
harmed by events that happen after his death.” 360 
Other scholars have embraced versions of this thesis, including Joel Fein-
berg, 361 Martha Nussbaum, 362 and Don Herzog. They have explored how 
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postmortem influences on one’s memory—including one’s creations or reputa-
tion—can alter one’s antemortem pursuits. As Nussbaum explains, because 
death “interrupt[s] their cherished projects, altering the shape of their lives,” 363 
events after death can harm a person, because those events terminate or un-
duly alter those pursuits. “[I]n many cases, events that happen after a person’s 
death can . . . be bad for a person.” 364 Among other examples, she describes a 
person who creates a trust, the core tenets of which are deviated from after 
death. 365 This alters the arc of the person’s life, even if there are sometimes 
sound reasons for such a departure. Rooted in a similar perspective, Herzog 
has focused on ways that reputational damage in death can alter the shape of 
projects one pursued in life. He hypothesizes about a person who worked to-
ward the creation of a local park and dies before it is complete. 366 Someone 
lies about the hypothetical person at his funeral, impugning his character such 
that people immediately stop devoting resources to the park. 367 In such an in-
stance, the project pursued by a once-living person is diminished. That is the 
harm. 
2. A Theory of Collective Posthumous Harm 
The accounts offered by Pitcher, Feinberg, Nussbaum, and Herzog focus 
on targeted, individualized betrayals, wrongs, and misfortunes. In Pitcher’s 
article, “Mr. Brown’s” son lied to him. 368 In Herzog’s book, a malicious gos-
siper lied specifically about a park’s advocate, leading a community to ask, 
“Who wants to keep working on what’s mordantly dubbed the Child Molester 
Park Project?” 369 But it is not difficult to imagine that a posthumous lie about 
a group could also alter the shape of a person’s antemortem pursuits. That is, 
the treatment of a group’s memory can impact the pursuits of members of that 
group. Suppose, for example, the lie at the funeral was not specifically about 
the park advocate but about the associates who were helping him build the 
park. Or suppose the defamatory falsehood was about an organization (e.g., a 
sorority or fraternity) to which the person belonged, altering the decedent’s 
reputation by wrongly stigmatizing a group. Could not this lie, too, alter the 
shape of the advocate’s antemortem pursuits? 
We do not have to merely hypothesize or suppose. In the United States, 
slaves had life pursuits that were altered by their collective treatment. As Ira 
Berlin contends in Generations of Captivity, “the slaves’ history—like all hu-
man history—was made not only by what was done to them but also by what 
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they did for themselves.” 370 Without the aegis of the law, they attempted to 
build families, create spiritual lives, 371 and become free members of the repub-
lic. 372 For example, Lea Vandervelde has taken up the task of documenting 
attempts by slaves to formally petition for their freedom. 373 
But their ability to pass on this familial, spiritual, and political legacy was 
impeded. And the treatment of their bodies was a part of the larger architec-
ture that undermined their ability to contribute their fair and equal share to 
our collective memory. Historian Daina Raimey Berry has written of how 
slave masters often sold Black bodies to medical schools. 374 In some instances, 
Black bodies were dug up from burial grounds without consent so they could 
be used as cadavers. 375 Moreover, slaves’ burial sites were ransacked by “grave 
robbers” or “body snatchers” who sold bodies to medical schools as well. 376 
Anatomists could appropriate the bodies of free Blacks without much risk or 
public outcry. 377 Hence, “the bodies of African Americans were once at the 
highest risk of being used for anatomy.” 378 The disregard of their bodies was 
both a symptom of their stigmatized status and a mode of reifying that stigma. 
Today, those neglected, forgotten bodies stand as tangible vessels of slaves’ 
stigmatized memory. 
If one accepts that slaves’ lives and dreams matter, then it also matters 
how we treat their memories. If it is harmful to betray one person’s memory 
and will, it is all the more harmful for a society to betray millions. If it is harm-
ful to interfere maliciously with a dead person’s dreams of building a commu-
nity park, then it is infinitely more harmful to interfere with an entire group’s 
ability to shape the very character and direction of the nation it calls home. 
How we treat slaves’ memories renders us complicit in a unique form of post-
humous harm. 
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C. Contextualizing Complicity 
1. Lineal Alienation 
Celebrated sociologist Orlando Patterson famously wrote about how one 
form of subordination a group can face is “natal alienation,” which occurs 
when a group is violently uprooted from its geographic, familial, and cultural 
origins. 379 Here I offer a related concept, lineal alienation, to bring focus to the 
multidirectional effects of this kind of violent uprooting. To be sure, this kind 
of violence affects the rootless subject, who has been deprived of important 
dimensions of social meaning. As Patterson explains, a person who is up-
rooted from claims of birth and ancestry is unable “to integrate the experience 
of their ancestors into their lives, to inform their understanding of social real-
ity with the inherited meanings of their natural forebears, or to anchor the 
living present in any conscious community of memory.” 380 But this deracina-
tion also has effects on, to put it inelegantly, the roots themselves: it posthu-
mously diminishes the collective memory and dignity of the subjugated group. 
More concretely, because posthumous social and legal protection de-
pends largely on the care of families and others who have a special relationship 
with the deceased, these protections collapse when descendants cannot engage 
in that care. Lineal alienation has inhibited posthumous care repeatedly in the 
United States. The history of indigenous persons, for example, has been char-
acterized by disruption through violent dispossession of land and separation 
of families. 381 Moreover, in the 1800s, the federal government encouraged and 
aided the raiding of Native cultural property and human remains. 382 This dis-
possession necessarily means that descendants are deprived of burial grounds, 
images, and creations of their ancestors. It also means that those burial grounds 
and creations are deprived of descendants who might otherwise care for them. 
Lineal alienation also describes much of America’s contemptible treat-
ment of people of African heritage in the United States. In life, American chat-
tel slavery treated Black children as the property of white masters who could 
be sold at the whims of cruelty and avarice. In death, slaves were often buried 
in separate and unequal sites where headstones were scant or nonexistent. 383 
Echoes of this past reverberate, in part through the recent discoveries of long-
forgotten slave burial grounds and convict-leasing sites across the United 
States. Even when slave cemeteries are known, the identities of the people bur-
ied in them are often unknown. The ornate and reverent tombstones in places 
like Oakland Cemetery in Atlanta, for example, stand in stark contrast with 
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the unmarked graves of slaves on the same grounds. 384 When a slave burial 
ground was discovered in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, historian Valerie 
Cunningham lamented, “Well, we don’t know their identity. We don’t know 
whose family they were connected to. We don’t know where they came from, 
if they were born here. We don’t really know anything.” 385 Lineal alienation 
has facilitated the perpetual dishonoring of slaves’ human dignity and further 
polluted America’s collective memory about its vile past. As a result, the en-
slaved dead have fewer trustees to remember and care for their legacy. 
2. Intentional Campaigns 
Our collective memory has also been corrupted by intentional campaigns 
to skew our national narrative. The starkest example is the veneration of the 
Confederacy without equivalent meaningful memorials to the Middle Passage 
and slavery. New Orleans mayor Mitch Landrieu has called this a “lie by omis-
sion.” 386 Throughout the South, the treatment of slaves’ memories is dramat-
ically overshadowed by the recognition of those who fought to keep them in 
bondage. 
A recent report by the Southern Poverty Law Center identified over 1,700 
Confederate monuments and symbols located across the South. 387 They were 
generally created between 1900 and 1930, as a part of an intentional, mass ef-
fort to minimize the brutality of chattel slavery and glorify the memory of 
those who fought against the United States in the Civil War. 388 Particularly 
prominent in that effort were the United Daughters of the Confederacy. 389 
Founded in 1894, by 1912 the organization boasted 800 chapters and 45,000 
members, predominately of the middle and upper classes in the South. 390 
Through their action, advocacy, and resources, they not only secured monu-
ments and memorials but also achieved official recognition of Confederate 
Memorial Days that are still honored in former Confederate states and towns. 
Moreover, history textbooks of the period presented a “glowing” narrative of 
the Confederacy that was “highly sympathetic” to the institution of slavery in 
a detached, scholarly tone. 391 
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These narratives received another boost in the wake of Brown v. Board of 
Education. Government officials in the South openly praised the Confederacy, 
and they wove the Confederate Battle Flag into the figurative and literal fabric 
of their identities and even their state flags. 392 South Carolina state senator 
John D. Long spoke of the “unique and added appropriateness [of] hang-
ing . . . this famous and beloved banner in the legislative halls of the . . . first 
state to secede from the Union.” He added: “[T]here are those who be-
lieve . . . that no cause is lost whose principle is right.”393 
In contrast, there are comparatively few memorials to the Middle Passage, 
chattel slavery, or the “slavery by another name” that followed well into the 
twentieth century. 394 In 1988, Toni Morrison remarked: 
There is no place you or I can go, to think about or not think about, to sum-
mon the presences of, or recollect the absences of slaves; nothing that re-
minds us of the ones who made the journey and of those who did not make 
it. There is no suitable memorial or plaque or wreath or wall or park or sky-
scraper lobby. There’s no 300-foot tower. There’s no small bench by the road. 
There is not even a tree scored, an initial that I can visit or you can visit in 
Charleston or Savannah or New York or Providence or, better still, on the 
banks of the Mississippi. 395 
To be sure, there are more memorials today than there were in 1988. 396 A 
museum is now being built on the shores of Charleston, near the ports where 
those who survived the Middle Passage disembarked. 397 There is even a “small 
bench by the road” in Sullivan’s Island, South Carolina, to memorialize slavery 
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and honor Morrison’s potent words. 398 Still, monuments and memorials to 
the Confederacy outnumber those to slavery and American apartheid. 399 
*     *      * 
Slaves’ neglected and exploited bodies and images are but two powerful 
and tangible dimensions of slaves’ intentionally diminished role in shaping 
our national memory. If it is wrong to deny a person of the ability to leave a 
legacy on account of her race under contemporary egalitarian norms, then we 
ought not engage in posthumous acts that rob slaves of that legacy. 
V. LEGAL REFORMS 
[T]he past never cooperates by staying in the past. Eventually it always reaches 
out to us and asks, What have you learned? 
Valerie Babb 400 
We have learned that the “law of the dead” depends heavily on culturally 
contingent concepts that can shift with time. 401 We have learned that in the 
United States, the predominant concepts that influence posthumous interests 
are consent, relationship, and motive. 402 We have also learned that temporal-
ity, historical inequality, and cultural shifts in egalitarian norms all make it 
difficult to apply those traditional concepts when it comes to the respectful 
treatment of victims of long-ago mass horrors. 403 And we have seen how it is 
possible for one generation to reproduce and perpetuate mass harm against 
deceased victims of an earlier generation—a risk that is escalated by America’s 
polluted collective memory and its history of lineal alienation. 404 There is but 
one task left: exploring legal reforms that can help avoid remaining complicit 
in this harm. That is the work of Part V. This Part will not engage in a com-
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prehensive exploration of broader ways to remediate harm inflicted upon de-
ceased victims of mass horror. Such an account of spiritual reparations 405 de-
serves careful attention, beyond what one article could purport to do. 
Nonetheless, there are more modest, but important, legal steps we could take 
to reduce our complicity. 
Four reforms are advanced here. First, when slave cemeteries are discov-
ered, the law should not place exclusive weight on biological kinship when de-
termining whether someone has a legal claim to protect the burial sites from 
desecration or disinterment. Second, additional process should be required be-
fore laws allow disinterment in disturbed burial grounds. Third, the discre-
tion-laden concepts that order the law of the dead—concepts like “compelling,” 
“outrageous,” and “public interest”—should be attentive to America’s history 
of violent subordination and lineal alienation. Fourth, policymakers should 
invest significantly in monuments, museums, historic preservation, and other 
measures designed to counter the corrupted memories about America’s past. 
A. Expansion of Cognizable Trustees 
When litigants attempt to protect slaves’ burial sites, these efforts are 
sometimes encumbered by America’s history of lineal alienation. Because of a 
national history of family separation and legal erasure, along with the absence 
of meaningful burial records for slaves, it is rare that slaves have contemporary 
persons who can prove biological kinship with a high degree of certainty. And 
because American law sometimes privileges (or demands) biological kinship 
for a person to assert an interest in protecting a dead body, efforts to protect 
slaves can be frustrated. This, however, is an avoidable outcome. We should 
recognize a broader class of persons who can bring a claim on behalf of the 
long dead, including reasonably probable kin who have a sincere, personal re-
lationship to a burial site. 
A Virginia case, El-Amin v. Virginia Commonwealth University, demon-
strates how lineal alienation can impede legal efforts to protect the memory of 
slaves. 406 In that case, Sa’ad El-Amin, a former Richmond city councilman, 
filed suit in state court seeking to stop the university from parking cars on top 
of a slave burial ground. In his view, it amounted to desecration to park auto-
mobiles atop the graves of individuals he believed were likely his family mem-
bers. At the time, he provocatively demanded that VCU “get [its] asphalt off 
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of our burial ground.” 407 According to a local press account, El-Amin “elon-
gate[ed] the first vowel” of the word “asphalt.” 408 He observed that commu-
nity members would be outraged if he parked on the graves of Confederate 
insurrectionists and that his ancestors deserved the same respect. El-Amin ac-
cordingly filed two suits: one was against the director of the state’s Depart-
ment of Historic Resources asking the state to protect the burial ground; the 
other was against VCU and its president, asking them to stop using the grave 
site as a parking lot. 
Although both suits were dismissed, the second lawsuit is of particular 
interest. There, VCU’s demurrer contended that El-Amin had insufficiently 
pled that he was biologically related to any of the slaves buried beneath the 
school’s parking lot. In the words of the filing, “El-Amin alleges . . . that his 
ancestors are ‘likely buried’ there. This necessarily concedes that they may not 
be buried there. Consequently, any declaratory relief inevitably rests on a 
speculative allegation that tacitly concedes that he may not have any ancestor 
buried in the Burial Ground at all.” 409 In response, El-Amin told the court, 
“For enslaved persons, the Burial Ground became their final resting place and 
they were buried anonymously. As a result of there being no record keeping, 
it is virtually impossible today for the living progeny of these unfortunate hu-
man beings to directly trace their ancestors’ interment in the Burial 
Ground.” 410 Confronted with these competing arguments, the court sided 
with VCU, holding that El-Amin lacked standing. The court acknowledged 
that El-Amin had an “assuredly ‘personal’ ” interest in the case. 411 However, 
the court reasoned, his personal interest in the case was not a “judicially cog-
nizable interest” sufficient to ensure “concrete adverseness.” 412 While a liti-
gant only needs an “ ‘identifiable trifle’ of legal interest to meet that threshold” 
under Virginia law, the court explained that El-Amin’s “alleged legal interest 
is not sufficient even under [that] standard.” 413 It continued, “Petitioner has 
alleged only one connection to the burial site, that his ancestors are ‘likely bur-
ied’ there. The attenuated nature of this claim makes it precisely ‘unidentifia-
ble’ . . . .”414 
The court expressly noted that its finding was attributable to slaves’ legal 
mistreatment. It recognized “the unique legal difficulties associated with slave 
burial grounds,” observing that “the history of legal treatment of slave and 
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other long-standing African-American burial grounds has been one of neglect 
or outright disregard.”415 As such, the court observed, “to prove that his ances-
tors are interred in this Burial Ground is akin to ‘proving a factual impossibil-
ity.’ ” 416 Still, standing was not satisfied. “[T]he particular legal issue the Court 
now faces is not the matter of the Burial Ground itself, but rather the issue of 
standing by a certain party to take legal action regarding that Burial Ground.” 417 
American egalitarian norms have come to disfavor validating the badges 
and incidents of slavery. 418 It is difficult to imagine a more direct incident of 
slavery than the disregarded, mistreated bodies of the enslaved. Is this out-
come justified by the principles that undergird standing doctrine? 
The doctrine of standing undoubtedly protects important interests. 419 
The court names one of those interests, namely, that there be sufficiently con-
crete adverseness between the parties. Adverseness ensures that strong, opposing 
legal arguments are provided on both sides, aiding the court in reaching an in-
formed, well-tested conclusion. 420 Adverseness also protects nonlitigants. By 
ensuring that the person advancing the claim is a person particularly close to 
the legal issue, standing doctrine prevents a person with a marginal interest in 
an issue from displacing someone in a better position to litigate the claims 
faithfully. Richard Re calls this kind of comparative analysis “relative stand-
ing.” 421 
Would those interests have been undermined by allowing El-Amin to 
proceed? That is, in a cemetery in which the name of every slave buried there 
was unknown, is it likely that there were other individuals who had a stronger 
adversarial interest that El-Amin, whose ancestors were from that geographic 
region? 422 And if not, are there legal standards short of demanding a demon-
strable biological relationship that would comport with standing principles 
without, in El-Amin’s words, “aid[ing], support[ing], and legitimiz[ing] the 
historical treatment of people of African descent as chattel property”? 423 
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While standing law varies across states, denying standing to someone who 
has a voluntary personal relationship with burial grounds is far from inevita-
ble. In ASPCA v. Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Circus, 424 the D.C. Cir-
cuit confronted whether a former circus employee had standing to stop the 
abuse of elephants based on an “aesthetic and emotional injury.”425 He con-
tended that he suffered upon witnessing the “mistreatment of the elephants to 
which he became emotionally attached during his tenure at Ringling Bros.” 426 
The court recognized that he sufficiently alleged standing, citing the em-
ployee’s “personal relationship with the elephants,” along with his “desire to 
visit the elephants” without seeing the “effects of mistreatment.” 427 This hold-
ing was consistent with Justice Scalia’s observation in Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife that “the desire to use or observe an animal species, even for purely es-
thetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of standing.” 428 
If a voluntary personal relationship with animals is sufficiently concrete 
and particularized to render an injury judicially cognizable even under the 
strict parameters of federal standing law, it is a negligible step to suggest that 
one’s credible, reasonable, voluntary relationship with a dead person in a 
graveyard is also concrete and particularized. All the truer for a litigant who 
alleges a desire to protect a resting place to which the litigant has geographic 
ties and that the litigant plans to imminently visit. Placing exclusive weight on 
demonstrable bloodline rather than a sincere relationship to the person and 
the site is not an ineluctable approach to standing. 
Indeed, when litigants sue to protect sites from environmental degradation, 
courts similarly confer standing based on the plaintiffs’ emotional relationship 
with the site. “[A] person ‘may derive great pleasure from visiting a certain river; 
the pleasure may be described as an emotional attachment stemming from the 
river’s pristine beauty.’ ” 429 Is it so different to confer standing on a person with 
an emotional attachment to a burial site? Might not a plaintiff have an emo-
tional relationship with a site where she believes her ancestors are buried? 
Standing cases about historic preservation also protect individuals’ vol-
untary, emotional relationship to physical sites. In Sierra Club v. Jewell, a co-
alition of organizations sued to place the site of the Battle of Blair Mountain 
on the National Register of Historic Places. 430 To demonstrate an injury-in-
fact, the organizations needed to “show that the asserted injury to [their] 
members is concrete and particularized, and is also actual or imminent.” 431 
The D.C. Circuit found that “members who view and enjoy the Battlefield’s 
aesthetic features, or who observe it for purposes of studying and appreciating 
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its history, would suffer a concrete and particularized injury from the conduct 
of surface mining on the Battlefield.” 432 Accordingly, those “members pos-
sess[ed] concrete interests in appreciating and studying the aesthetic features 
and historical significance of a preserved and intact Battlefield.” 433 
El-Amin was attempting to protect a burial ground from degradation, a 
site toward which he had a strong emotional attachment. The court itself 
“note[d] the extremely personal nature of the subject matter.” 434 Just as one of 
the plaintiffs in Jewell believed that the site of a labor conflict was “hallowed” 
ground, El-Amin was making a similar claim about the burial site. Failure to 
prove biological kinship does not negate this “extremely personal” relation-
ship. A more capacious understanding of who can serve as a trustee for the 
dead is both possible and warranted. 
B. Abandonment Revisited 
The cemeteries of slaves are often abandoned, in the factual sense. They 
have experienced extreme neglect and fallen out of communities’ conscious-
ness. That is why they are often discovered inadvertently. 435 When burial 
grounds are discovered, the human remains found there should receive con-
siderably more procedural and substantive protection than they currently do. 
Current law requires that a person aware of the presence of human remains 
on a site receive permission before moving the remains. But when these bodies 
are discovered inadvertently, bodies can often be moved with little in the way 
of procedural or substantive protection. 
The episode at the University of Georgia brings this issue into stark relief. 
On the face of it, Georgia law provides meaningful protection for burial sites, 
even abandoned ones. A Georgia statute provides: 
[H]uman remains and burial objects are not property to be owned by the 
person or entity which owns the land or water where the human remains and 
burial objects are interred or discovered, but human remains and burial ob-
jects are a part of the finite, irreplaceable, and nonrenewable cultural heritage 
of the people of Georgia which should be protected. 436 
As such, Georgia law is to “be construed to require respectful treatment 
of human remains in accord with the equal and innate dignity of every human 
being and consistent with the identifiable ethnic, cultural, and religious affili-
ation of the deceased individual as indicated by the method of burial or other 
historical evidence or reliable information.” 437 
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Consistent with these intentions, under Georgia law, “No known ceme-
tery, burial ground, human remains, or burial object shall be knowingly dis-
turbed by the owner or occupier of the land . . . unless a permit is first 
obtained . . . .”438 For most actors, this kind of permit may be obtained from 
the “municipal corporation or county wherein the cemetery or burial ground 
is located.” 439 When the state is the entity seeking to disturb the site, the permit 
must be sought and granted by a court of general jurisdiction. 440 Among other 
things, the application for a permit must include “[a] plan prepared by a ge-
nealogist for identifying and notifying the descendants of those buried or be-
lieved to be buried in such cemetery.” 441 Further, “If the proposal includes 
relocation of any human remains or burial objects, the proposal shall specify 
the method of disinterment, the location and method of disposition of the re-
mains, the approximate cost of the process, and the approximate number of 
graves affected.” 442 
Before the relevant governing authority may issue a permit, it must hold 
a public hearing. 443 Additionally, the authority “shall” consider the following 
factors: 
(1) The presumption in favor of leaving the cemetery or burial ground un-
disturbed; (2) The concerns and comments of any descendants of those bur-
ied in the burial ground or cemetery and any other interested parties; (3) The 
economic and other costs of mitigation; (4) The adequacy of the applicant’s 
plans for disinterment and proper disposition of any human remains or bur-
ial objects; (5) The balancing of the applicant’s interest in disinterment with 
the public’s and any descendant’s interest in the value of the undisturbed 
cultural and natural environment; and (6) Any other compelling factors 
which the governing authority deems relevant. 444 
Finally, a county or municipal government’s issuance of a permit is appeala-
ble. 445 The human remains must generally remain undisturbed during the 
pendency of the appeal. 446 
None of this happened when slaves’ bodies were discovered at the Uni-
versity of Georgia. No permit was sought, let alone granted. No governing au-
thority—judicial or otherwise—held a hearing where probable descendants 
and other interested parties could make their case. No governing authority 
evaluated the legitimacy of the university’s decisions with respect to whether 
or how to reinter the bodies. Perhaps a court would have endorsed the uni-
versity’s decision to dig up the bodies, put them in moving trucks without 
 
 438. Id. § 36-72-4. 
 439. Id. 
 440. Id. § 36-72-14. 
 441. Id. § 36-72-5. 
 442. Id. 
 443. Id. § 36-72-7. 
 444. Id. § 36-72-12. 
 445. Id. § 36-72-11. 
 446. Id. § 36-72-12. 
258 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 120:195 
alerting the public, and place them in a mass grave in a formerly all-white 
cemetery. 447 But no court was ever asked. 
No permit was required because the discovery of the graves was purport-
edly unintentional. As the ad hoc faculty committee appointed to investigate 
the incident explained explained, “[P]recisely because the discoveries were ac-
cidental, they were subject to less stringent regulation than if they had been 
detected prior to the start of construction. . . . [I]n this particular case, because 
these discoveries were accidental, UGA was free to move them without ac-
quiring permits.” 448 By failing to care for a cemetery full of people who were 
violently forced to build the university, and by neglecting it for so long that 
members of the administration were unaware that slaves were buried there, 
the university avoided having to apply for a permit. It avoided a public hear-
ing, where the presumption would have been against reinterment and where 
the compelling story of the people who built UGA could have been told. It 
avoided meaningful, transparent review of its plans. It avoided all this because 
it forgot where its slaves were buried. 
A sounder approach would be to require a permit to disinter human re-
mains, even those that are inadvertently discovered. If “human remains and 
burial objects are a part of the finite, irreplaceable, and nonrenewable cultural 
heritage of the people of Georgia which should be protected,” 449 it is not ap-
parent why that cultural heritage is less important when dealing with bodies 
that were so badly neglected that we “forgot” where they were buried. If it is 
important to afford “respectful treatment of human remains in accord with 
the equal and innate dignity of every human being,” 450 it is not clear why pro-
tection should be unavailable to unrecorded, legally erased slaves. Even if their 
equal dignity was not respected in times past, that hardly furnishes grounds 
for disregarding their dignity today. But in a sense that is precisely what hap-
pened. The failure to protect and record the slaves’ burial site meant that their 
bodies had very little legal protection when they were discovered. 
C. Historically Informed Balancing 
The law of the dead is replete with standards that allow for considerable 
discretion. In the UGA example, if a permit had been sought, a court would 
have considered the “adequacy” of the disinterment plans, “the public’s and 
any descendant’s interest[s],” as well as “[a]ny other compelling factors which 
the governing authority deems relevant.” 451 In addition to the procedural pro-
tections advanced in Section V.B, courts should take history into account 
when deciding what is adequate, compelling, in “the public interest,” reason-
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able, or even outrageous. Failure to do so can reinforce the treatment margin-
alized groups have experienced in the past, further subordinating them in our 
collective memory. 
Lanier v. Harvard University offers a helpful legal context for exploring 
this potentiality. 452 In 2019, Tamara Lanier sued Harvard University for pos-
sessing, using, and financially profiting from images of her deceased family 
members. Featured in the photographs are Renty and Delia, both of whom 
were slaves when the photos were taken. The photographs were commis-
sioned by Harvard professor Louis Agassiz, an early eugenicist who attempted 
to prove the inherently “subhuman” nature of nonwhites. 453 Lanier’s lawsuit 
relies on multiple theories of liability, including that Harvard lacks legal title 
to the photographs, that the photos are being used without authorization, that 
use of the photos violates federal and state civil rights laws, and that Harvard 
is engaging in the negligent infliction of emotional distress, as well as conver-
sion and unjust-enrichment claims. 454 
Almost two years after the complaint was filed, the trial court dismissed 
all of Lanier’s claims. 455 In the dismissal, the court categorized most of the 
allegations as “property-related claims.” 456 According to the court, “It is a 
basic tenet of common law that the subject of a photograph has no interest in 
the negative or any photographs printed from the negative . . . ; rather, the 
negative and any photographs are the property of the photographer.” 457 
Curiously, however, one of Lanier’s claims that the court treated as “prop-
erty-related” is in fact a tort claim: negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
Under the tort of negligence, individuals have a duty to “exercise that degree of 
care as would be exercised by a reasonable person under the circumstances.”458 
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Treating this type of tort claim as a matter of property law was a severe, 
and perhaps consequential, misstep by the trial court. The unreasonable pub-
lication or treatment of sensitive photographs—regardless of who owns 
them—has sometimes furnished a basis for tort liability. 459 The tort of negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress has been recognized, for example, when a 
school negligently allowed students to display sexually derogatory photo-
graphs of the plaintiff in a manner that contributed to her harassment. 460 Like-
wise, publication of gruesome photographs of human remains has given rise 
to liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 461 To be sure, such 
cases can only teach us so much. The photographs of Renty and Delia, while 
debasing and dehumanizing, are not alleged to have been sexually derogatory. 
And while the forced, degrading photographs capture them in a state of “social 
death” 462 and “civil death,” 463 they do not depict Renty and Delia’s physical 
death. These types of cases are nonetheless clarifying because they show that 
this tort has sometimes been recognized for the handling or publication of 
sensitive photographs, without regard to who owned them. 
More broadly, many principles that traditionally guide considerations 
about treatment of the dead count against the university’s continued use of 
photographs of Renty and Delia, considerations like decedent’s intent, rela-
tionship, motive, and culpability. Neither Renty nor Delia consented to be 
photographed, 464 the person seeking to terminate the use of the photographs 
is Renty and Delia’s closest living kin, 465 the photographs were taken in an 
attempt to perpetuate falsehoods about Black inferiority, 466 and Harvard has 
 
Physical Impact or Be in Zone of Danger, 89 A.L.R.5TH 255, 289 (2001) (“[T]he scope of a de-
fendant’s duty is limited to injuries that are the foreseeable result of the defendant’s careless-
ness.”); 38 AM. JUR. 2D Fright, Shock, and Mental Disturbance § 4 (2019) (“If the actor 
unintentionally causes emotional distress to another, he or she is subject to liability to the other 
for resulting illness or bodily harm . . . .”). 
 459. See, e.g., Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971); Barber v. Time, Inc., 
159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942); cf. Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940). 
 460. Tyrrell v. Seaford Union Free Sch. Dist., No. CV-08-4811, 2010 WL 1198055 
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2010). 
 461. Catsouras v. Dep’t of the Cal. Highway Patrol, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352, 335 (Ct. App. 2010). 
But see Reid v. Pierce Cnty., 961 P.2d 333, 335 (Wash. 1998) (en banc) (holding that invasion of 
familial privacy, rather than negligence, was the proper tort to invoke under such circumstances). 
 462. See generally PATTERSON, supra note 40 (describing American chattel slavery as im-
posing a system of social death on the enslaved). 
 463. “Civil death is the status of a person who has been deprived of all civil rights.” Legis-
lative Note, Civil Death Statutes—Medieval Fiction in a Modern World, 50 HARV. L. REV. 968 
(1937). In the American and English common law traditions, civil death was sometimes imposed 
as a punishment for some forms of crime. Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Pun-
ishment in the Era of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1793–94 (2012). Chattel slavery, 
by its nature, imposed civil death, depriving slaves of all civil rights. 
 464. Complaint & Jury Demand, supra note 228, at 1. 
 465. Id. at 3–4. 
 466. Id. at 7. 
November 2021] On Time, (In)equality, and Death 261 
profited from the photographs in recent decades. 467 According to the com-
plaint, 
Harvard’s conduct—including but not limited to its use of the daguerreotypes 
for profit, refusal to engage in good faith with Ms. Lanier, its denial of her 
claim of lineage, and its deception about the images’ provenance—was under-
taken in negligent or reckless disregard for how it would affect Ms. Lanier. 468 
As this Article has argued, in assessing a claim like Lanier’s, courts should 
remember that foreseeability and reasonable care are concepts that can shift 
across time in light of shifting values. This includes egalitarian values. When 
Agassiz commissioned photographs of Renty and Delia to prove his theory of 
white supremacy, he did so in a context in which it was legal to hold Black 
persons in bondage as chattel. Members of the politically and socially domi-
nant class might not have been concerned with the distress it would cause to 
profit from Renty and Delia’s pain, let alone their families’ pain. However, 
values about racial equality have changed markedly over time. And accord-
ingly, it is highly plausible that today there is a broader range of conduct that 
would tend to foreseeably distress a slave’s surviving family members. 
On this theory, then, our legal system should ask more than whether a 
reasonable institution would know that a great-great-great-grandchild would 
be distressed by the decision to profit from unauthorized photography. Courts 
should take into account the motives behind the photograph, the legal and 
social context of the photograph, and the violent nature of the slavery that 
facilitated the photograph. All of this contextualizes the distress and outrage 
expressed by a descendant of slaves when her ancestors’ bodies and images are 
mistreated. And the more these descendants express their pain, the more fore-
seeable this distress becomes. To ignore this context in assessing what is rea-
sonable is to be complicit in past horror. 
D. Investing in Memory 
“We imagine the past to remember the future.” 469 Our architecture, to-
pography, words, and laws are a living museum filled with reminders of the 
past. For example, Sanford Levinson reminds us that ambitious men and 
women with political power have often used grand monuments to influence 
the memories and cognitive frames of future generations. 470 As Levinson 
writes, “[M]onuments are quintessentially ‘about time’ and who shall control 
the meaning assigned to Proustian moments of past time.” 471 Norm Spaulding 
writes of how memorials should invite perpetual remembrance and contested 
 
 467. Id. at 21. 
 468. Id. at 22. 
 469. Guido Calabresi, Conversation, “We Imagine the Past to Remember the Future”—Be-
tween Law, Economics, and Justice in Our Era and According to Maimonides, 26 YALE J.L. & 
HUMANS. 135 (2014). 
 470. See LEVINSON, supra note 386, at 5. 
 471. Id. at 25. 
262 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 120:195 
narratives: “The problem is . . . that in seeking to do justice to the past we long 
for the very closure of judgment, along with its too-tidy hierarchical ordering 
of authoritative evidence, that memories of irreparable injury can never be 
expected to provide.” 472 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to offer a comprehensive guide to 
precisely how we should better account for the inequalities in our collective 
memories about the past: what “countermonuments” and memorials should 
look like, 473 how schools should teach difficult history, 474 or what should be 
done with monuments to the Confederacy. 475 But this Article has offered yet 
another reason for why we should invest in a more egalitarian collective 
memory, intentionally unshackled from past subordination. Refusing to de-
toxify our collective memory is not only a disservice to ourselves but an en-
couragement to continued assaults on victims of mass subordination. 
CONCLUSION 
History, despite its wrenching pain, [c]annot be unlived, but if faced [w]ith courage, 
need not be lived again. 
Maya Angelou 476 
All your buried corpses now begin to speak. 
James Baldwin 477 
When institutions encounter physical manifestations of past horror, these 
discoveries offer evidence, risk, and opportunity. Brutalized bodies, neglected 
burial sites, and exploited photographs furnish evidence of how subordination 
survives death. They tell stories of posthumous dehumanization, disrespect, 
and the systemic denial of groups’ rightful role in shaping our nation’s collec-
tive memory. Moreover, with this evidence comes risk. Today’s actions and 
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omissions can facilitate the continued legal and social erasure of enslaved and 
indigenous persons’ humanity. 
Yet, these discoveries also offer opportunities to reject history’s invitation 
to subvert the memory, will, and spiritual strivings of subordinated peoples. 
We, the living, can take active steps to avoid complicity in past horrors. We 
can honor the legacies of those who, through law and custom, were intention-
ally denied the right to leave their mark on our polity and consciousness. We 
can seek to remediate indignities perpetuated against people who never re-
ceived anything resembling a remedy. “[O]ut of a mountain of despair,” we 
can extract “a stone of hope.” 478 While we can inflict wounds of indignity after 
death, we also have the power to prescribe healing measures of justice. 
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